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OVERVIEW
Literature Review: Is Atypical Mentalizing a Risk Factor for Psychosis?
The literature review summarises models and rationale underpinning investigation of 
atypical mentalizing as a risk factor for psychosis, and reviews longitudinal and cross- 
sectional studies relating to this. It concludes that, although differences in social 
cognition can be demonstrated to be associated with risk for psychosis, findings to date 
are mixed, and a focus on the presence or absence of mentalizing skills has limited 
exploration of the nature of these putative differences.
Empirical Paper: Theory of Mind and its Relation to Schizotypy.
This section reports an experimental comparison of the performance of high and low 
schizotypes on verbal and non-verbal measures o f theory o f mind. In the non-verbal 
domain, high schizotypes were significantly more likely than low schizotypes to read 
meaning in randomness and to impute agency or mental states where none were 
obviously implied. These tendencies were associated with positive schizotypy in 
particular. The findings are discussed in relation to Frith’s (1992) cognitive model of 
schizophrenia and existing studies of theory of mind and schizotypy and schizophrenia.
Critical Appraisal:
A critical review of the process of the above study is presented. Observations made 
during the planning, data collection, data analysis and interpretation stages o f the project 
are described, and suggestions are made for future research.
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Literature Review:
Is Atypical Mentalizing a Risk Factor for
Psychosis?
IS ATYPICAL MENTALIZING A RISK FACTOR FOR
PSYCHOSIS?
ABSTRACT
Investigation o f  risk factors fo r  psychosis is currently pertinent with increasing focus 
being placed on early interventions fo r  psychotic disorders. This review outlines the 
‘diathesis-stress m odel’, models o f  vulnerability to psychosis and the 'high-risk 
paradigm ’ as concepts underpinning research into risk fo r  psychosis. It discusses the 
concept o f  ‘theory o f  m ind’ (ToM) or ‘mentalizing’ and presents reasons for proposing 
that an abnormality in this domain o f  functioning may be a risk factor for psychosis. 
Published literature reviews are relied on to summarise studies o f  ToM and 
schizophrenia pre-dating 2003 while more recent studies are discussed individually. 
Longitudinal and cross-sectional relative and schizotypy studies relevant to the 
relationship between mentalizing and vulnerability to psychosis are then reviewed. It is 
argued that ToM is a multi-faceted concept, which varies along continua both within 
and between clinical and non-clinical populations and, fo r  some individuals at least, 
across time. Although there is evidence fo r  atypical social cognition amongst those 
vulnerable to psychosis, existing studies report varied findings and, with their focus on 
the presence or absence o f  ToM abilities, may fa il to fu lly  capture the nature o f  putative 
mentalizing differences.
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INVESTIGATING RISK FACTORS FOR PSYCHOSIS
There is a growing body of evidence that suggests that intervening early in the course of 
psychosis can improve treatment outcome (Garety et. al., 2006; Larsen et. al., 2001; 
Malla & Norman, 2002; Petersen et. al., 2005). Although controversy exists over the 
validity of this evidence (e.g. Warner, 2005), a general consensus in its favour has 
fuelled government commitment to ‘early intervention in psychosis’ (Department of 
Health, 2000, 2001).
Early intervention services offer psychosocial and pharmacological treatment to those 
who have experienced a first psychotic episode and, in some instances, to those with no 
history of psychosis who exhibit the sub-clinical signs and symptoms often cited as 
precursors to its development. However, many indicators o f the so-called ‘prodrome’ 
are non-specific, overlapping considerably with affective disorders and with behavioural 
changes common in adolescence (e.g. problems with social functioning); and it is argued 
that early intervention runs the risk o f negatively affecting those who score ‘false- 
positives’ on prodrome screens (Warner, 2005). Increasingly powerful and specific 
operational criteria are being developed for identifying those likely to develop psychosis 
(e.g. Phillips, Yung & McGorry, 2000; Yung, Phillips, Yuen & McGorry, 2004); 
however, there are clear benefits associated with broadening our understanding of trait 
markers o f psychosis-proneness and of factors involved in the aetiology of psychosis.
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THE DIATHESIS-STRESS MODEL
The ‘diathesis-stress model’ is a widely accepted conceptualisation of the development 
o f psychosis (e.g. see Gottesman, 1991). The model describes how multiple genetic, 
biological, psychological, social and environmental influences leave an individual 
vulnerable to the illness. Particular stressors then interact with this vulnerability to 
trigger the onset o f a psychotic disorder. No single risk factor or stress is thought 
necessary or sufficient for psychosis to develop, rather the variables implicated are many 
and wide-ranging, including for example, pre-natal and post-natal complications and 
infections, abuse or neglect during childhood, low cognitive ability, aspects of familial 
environment, urbanicity, minority status and cannabis smoking (e.g. see Fergusson, 
Poulton, Smith & Boden, 2006; Isohanni et al., 2005; Read, van Os, Morrison & Ross, 
2005; Semple, McIntosh & Lawrie, 2005; van Os, Krabbendam, Myin-Germeys & 
Delespaul, 2005; Walker, Kestler, Bollini & Hochman, 2004). The search for risk 
factors for psychosis is therefore immensely broad. For the purpose of the current 
discussion, ‘risk factor’ will refer to a characteristic occurring before an illness 
manifests, which is associated with an increased likelihood o f becoming unwell 
(Fletcher, Fletcher & Wagner, 1996).
MODELS OF VULNERABILITY TO PSYCHOSIS
In line with the diathesis-stress model, vulnerability to psychosis is sometimes described 
in terms of characteristics of individual difference that predispose a person towards
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psychotic breakdown when adverse physical, social, or environmental triggers are 
encountered. There is variation in the extent to which this vulnerability is viewed to be 
continuous throughout the population in its distribution.
More orthodox psychiatric, ‘quasi-dimensional’ models (e.g. Meehl, 1962) argue for a 
continuum of vulnerability only within a subset of individuals who possess a particular 
schizophrenic genotype. This genotype underpins a nervous system dysfunction, which 
Meehl terms ‘schizotaxia’, manifest at the phenotypic level in ‘schizotypal’ personality 
characteristics and behaviours. This model implies that particular schizotypal attributes 
can be identified only within the vulnerable subset o f the population (i.e. those with the 
at-risk genotype.)
Fully-dimensional models (e.g. Claridge, 1994; Johns & van Os, 2001) by contrast 
describe vulnerability to psychosis (‘schizotypy’) as occurring along one, or possibly 
several, continua on which all individuals vary. These continua are argued to be 
normally distributed, genetically loaded dimensions o f personality traits and cognitive 
variables of which the clinical symptoms o f psychosis are viewed as extreme 
expressions. The fully-dimensional model predicts continuity in vulnerability markers 
throughout the population.
Support for the fully-dimensional approach comes from evidence for psychotic-like 
experiences widely present in the normal population (Johns et al., 2004) and from 
studies employing questionnaire measures derived from the approach (e.g. Oxford 
Liverpool Inventory o f Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE: Mason, Claridge & Jackson,
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1995); Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ: Raine, 1991)). The distribution, 
factor structure, heritability and predictive power of scores on these scales (Chapman, 
Chapman, Kwapil, Eckblad & Zinser, 1994; Claridge et. al., 1996; Claridge & Hewitt, 
1987; Johns & van Os, 2001; Kendler et al., 1991; Kendler & Hewitt, 1992) provide 
supportive evidence for schizophrenia-like traits in the normal population predisposing 
individuals towards psychotic breakdown when adverse physical, social, or 
environmental triggers are encountered (see Claridge, 1994 for a review).
The fully-dimensional approach to psychosis-proneness provides a rationale for viewing 
attenuated forms of the cognitive and biological attributes associated with the psychotic 
state as potential markers of vulnerability (risk factors) for psychosis in the non-clinical 
population.
THE HIGH-RISK PARADIGM
The ‘high-risk paradigm’ involves selecting individuals in the non-clinical population on 
the basis of some attribute hypothesised to put them at risk, and investigating whether 
particular characteristics in these ‘at risk’ individuals predict the likelihood of illness 
developing.
This approach can take the form of longitudinal follow-up o f those identified as 
vulnerable at a young age. Most commonly such studies recruit children of adults with 
schizophrenia (hypothesised to be vulnerable on the basis of shared genetic and usually
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environmental influences) as a high-risk sample, and matched control groups drawn 
from other populations. Possible associations are investigated between characteristics 
and experiences of the high-risk sample and later psychiatric outcome, to ascertain 
which of these constitute likely risk factors for the illness.
An alternative design again focuses on relatives as a high-risk group and uses cross- 
sectional comparisons between those with relatives who have schizophrenia and those 
without to establish whether the closeness of relation to a patient with schizophrenia is 
associated with particular putative vulnerability factors.
Alternatively, cross-sectional and longitudinal comparisons can be made between those 
who do and do not, according to some criteria, carry personality and cognitive traits that 
make them vulnerable to psychotic breakdown. This approach often draws on measures 
derived from the continuity models discussed above, such that individuals classed as 
high-risk are those who score highly on questionnaire measures of ‘psychosis- 
proneness’ (e.g. Chapman et al., 1994). The relationships of schizotypy scores to traits 
and experiences hypothesised to constitute risk factors for psychosis are investigated.
Although much of the high-risk research has focused on ‘endophenotypic information’, 
which lies between genetic and psychiatric indicators of schizophrenia (Claridge, 1994), 
the high-risk paradigm may guide the search for vulnerability factors that are either 
genetically or environmentally underpinned. Identified risk factors may play a role in 
the development o f psychosis as part of its diathesis, its stress, or both, or may simply 
constitute markers of risk with no active role in the pathogenesis of the disorder.
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Claridge (1994) describes high-risk studies in the psychosis literature conducted within 
the fields of cognitive psychology, psychophysiology and cerebral laterality research. 
One aspect o f cognitive functioning that may vary with vulnerability to psychosis is 
ToM.
CONCEPT OF THEORY OF MIND
‘Theory of mind’ is a term originally coined by Premack and W oodruff (1978). It refers 
to the ability to represent the mental states (thoughts, intentions and beliefs) o f others 
and to use these representations to predict and understand behaviours (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978). Frith, Morton and Leslie (1991) call this ability ‘mentalizing’. 
Impairments in ToM have been described in a variety o f neuropsychiatric disorders, 
most extensively in autistic spectrum disorders (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 
1985), in adults with frontal lobe damage (e.g. Rowe, Bullock, Polkey & Morris, 2001; 
Stuss, Gallup & Alexander, 2001) and in schizophrenia (e.g. Frith, 1992).
There are two dominant broad conceptualisations o f the psychological mechanisms 
underpinning mature ToM functioning, each of which has several variations (Carruthers 
& Smith, 1996). Meta-representational approaches (both ‘modular’ and ‘theory - 
theory’) (e.g. Perner, 1991; Scholl & Leslie, 1999) propose that mentalizing abilities rest 
on an implicitly held body of knowledge about mental states and rules of inference 
regarding these. Simulation theorists (e.g. Davies & Stone, 1995) by contrast, argue that 
ToM functioning is mediated by an ability to project oneself imaginatively into another
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person’s perspective. Further conceptualisations combine both simulation and meta- 
representational approaches, maintaining that some components of ToM are 
underpinned by simulation and others by theory.
With regard to the development of mentalizing abilities, theorists from both camps argue 
for some degree of genetic endowment. Amongst proponents of meta-representation, 
modular theorists argue for an innate, encapsulated, domain specific ‘ToM mechanism’, 
the development of which may pass through a number of intermediate theory-like stages 
and may depend on triggering experiences from the environment (e.g. Scholl & Leslie, 
1999). Theory-theory accounts place more emphasis on learning through experience as 
theories about the nature of mentalizing are constructed and revised, but some innate 
basis for ToM acquisition is generally proposed. Within simulation theories, a less 
specific innate endowment is argued to underpin ToM development. This is generally 
characterised as, for example, the ability to imagine or to think counter-factually. An 
element of learning is then argued to be required for the acquisition of mature adult 
mentalizing.
Universal patterns are observed in the stepwise development of ToM abilities (Leslie, 
1987) and the above perspectives attempt to account for these. Perner (1991), for 
example, argues that primary representations of the physical state of the world develop 
first and are a necessary pre-cursor to the subsequent development of secondary 
representations, which are representations of how things could be rather than how things 
are. Finally, the development of ‘meta-representations’, which is dependent on the
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successful development of earlier stages, allows for scientific-like theorising about the 
mental states of others.
The above descriptions of ToM and its emergence focus on the information processing 
mechanisms underpinning a singular developmental path. Generally they refer to ToM 
as a specific faculty, separable from more general cognitive abilities such as executive 
function and general intelligence. Indeed, distinct, overlapping brain networks have 
been proposed to underpin ToM and empathy (Lee, Farrow, Spence & Woodruff, 2004).
In line with this, accounts of ToM dysfunction have traditionally focused on the 
presence or absence of either the conceptual abilities required to imagine or to consider 
mental states (e.g. representational skills), or o f the processing capacities necessary for 
the successful application of these conceptual abilities (e.g. memory, access to stored 
information, inhibition of reality). Variation in the signs and symptoms of the range of 
disorders argued to arise from disruption to a ToM mechanism is accounted for in terms 
of differences in the age of onset of the disorder (and associated differences in learning 
prior to onset) and in the potential for additional cognitive deficits to give rise to further 
impairments (Frith & Frith, 1991). However, less consideration has been given to 
individual differences in normal ToM functioning and to variation across situations in 
the mentalizing abilities of any individual. Carpendale and Lewis (2004) point to the 
need for theories to account for the influence of social interaction on the development o f 
normal ToM functioning.
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The evidence for the significance of this influence is considerable (Carpendale & Lewis, 
2004; de Rosnay & Hughes, 2006). For example, young children whose parents 
frequently give explanations referring to emotions when talking to them show better 
ability to identify and reason about emotional states than do children whose parents use 
such terms less often (Denham, Zoller & Couchoud, 1994) and family feeling-state talk 
at 33 months predicts children’s emotion understanding and false-belief explanations at 
40 months (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla & Youngblade, 1991). Fonagy, Gergely, 
Jurist and Target (2002) describe cross-sectional and longitudinal studies in which 
infants’ attachment to their primary caregiver(s) has been shown to predict their current 
and future ability to reason about beliefs and desires. Finally, a large-scale twin study 
investigating genetic and environmental contributions to children’s ToM found that, 
amongst 5 year-olds, genetic influences explained only 7% of the variance in ToM 
understanding, while shared environmental and non-shared environmental influences 
accounted for 48% and 45% of the variance respectively (Hughes et al., 2005).
Fonagy et al. (2002) refer to the capacity to “envision mental states in self and others” as 
‘reflective function’ and argue that this capacity normally develops through an 
interpersonal process which provides the child with the experience of his/her mental 
states being reflected on. Multiple interacting, social, environmental and individual 
influences, including parenting style and the child’s biological vulnerabilities, are 
posited to shape this development. The authors present a framework in which 
abnormalities o f reflective function are central to the development of psychopathology, 
in particular borderline personality disorder. This framework points to variability in
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reflective function within, and not solely between, psychiatric and non-clinical 
populations.
Furthermore Fonagy et al. (2002) argue that an individual’s reflective function varies, 
like all cognitive abilities, across contexts, and that reflective capacity in one domain of 
interpersonal interaction does not necessarily generalize to others. Reflective function is 
conceptualised to develop as a skill tied to the task and domain where it is learned (e.g. 
within a specific category of relationship) and to vary with differences in affect and in 
the meaning and physical context of an interaction. Although normal development 
proceeds towards integration of abilities across contexts, unevenness is argued to remain 
into adulthood, and to develop in some cases as a means o f avoiding physical and 
psychological pain in particular situations.
There are therefore grounds to argue that individual differences in ToM abilities exist 
across the population, and within individuals across contexts. On the basis of this 
perspective, a model describing a ‘deficit’ or absence of reflective function in particular 
individuals may well be an over-simplification.
MEASURING THEORY OF MIND
Stone, Baron-Cohen, Calder, Keane and Young (2003) outline three types of ToM 
paradigm. Firstly there are those that measure epistemic mental states (mental states that 
refer to something in the world, such as knowledge, attention or belief.) The classic
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measure o f ToM, the ‘false-belief task’ (Dennet, 1978; Wimmer & Pemer, 1983), falls 
into this category. False-belief tasks test an individual’s ability to infer another’s 
knowledge or belief about a situation usually by assessing understanding of stories, 
verbally or pictorially presented or acted out with puppets. These paradigms may 
measure ‘first-order false-beliefs’, which involve representation of the beliefs of a 
character, or more complex ‘second-order false-beliefs’, which reflect understanding of 
a character’s beliefs about the thoughts or beliefs o f a third character. A second type of 
ToM task focuses on intentions as mental states. Examples of such tasks are those that 
measure understanding of hints or jokes where this relies on inferences being made 
about the intention of a character in a story or cartoon; and tasks that require participants 
to choose the most likely card to complete comic strip sequences where a judgement 
must be made about the character’s intention in order to do so. Paradigms that measure 
the ability to infer deceptive intent also fall into this category. The last of Stone et al.’s 
(2003) categories covers those tasks that measure understanding of affective mental 
states such as desire. Such tasks may require participants to infer how a character feels 
based on a story or on a picture of the character’s eyes.
Some ToM tasks measure more than one of these abilities (e.g. Fletcher et al.’s (1995) 
‘Stories Task’) and further ToM paradigms that do not fit easily into this categorisation 
can be identified. One additional class of mentalizing task employed in schizophrenia 
research comprises measures of pragmatic comprehension of speech. Paradigms 
assessing understanding of language devices such as metaphor and irony, compliance 
with conventional speech maxims, and general conversational style fall into this 
category. Finally, the ability to identify another person’s visual perspective has been
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argued to reflect mentalizing abilities and tests of this ability have been employed in 
ToM research.
Harrington, Siegert and McClure (2005) argue that the psychometric properties of these 
various ToM tasks have not been fully evaluated and suggest that discrepancies in 
findings across studies of ToM in schizophrenia may in part be a reflection of this. The 
majority of studies in this field use only one paradigm, precluding any evaluation of the 
extent to which they are indeed measures of the same construct.
WHY PROPOSE ABNORMAL MENTALIZING AS A RISK FACTOR FOR 
SCHIZOPHRENIA?
1. Theory of Mind and Schizophrenia
Frith (1992) proposed that a range of symptoms characteristic of schizophrenia could be 
explained in terms of an impairment in ToM. In Frith’s (1992) account, compromised 
ability to represent one’s own goals underpins disorders of ‘willed action’ (e.g. negative 
and disorganized symptoms), impaired ability to represent one’s own intentions results 
in disorders of self-monitoring (e.g. delusions of control, voice-commenting 
hallucinations and thought insertion) and inability to represent the intentions of others 
leads to symptoms such as delusions of reference, paranoid delusions and third person 
hallucinations.
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Frith’s model draws on Pemer’s (1991) account of the progressive development of 
‘meta-representational’ abilities discussed above. It distinguishes between the ability to 
represent one’s own goals, awareness of one’s own intentions and other mental states, 
and awareness of the mental states of others, and argues that these three abilities develop 
in succession. On the grounds of this distinction, patients with prominent negative or 
disorganized ‘behavioural’ symptoms are predicted to perform most poorly on ToM 
tasks because of their incapacity to represent mental states at all. Patients with paranoid 
symptoms are argued to be aware that other people have mental states, but impaired in 
accurately monitoring these as they struggle to use contextual information to make 
correct ‘on-line’ inferences about them. These patients are therefore expected to 
perform worse than healthy controls on measures of ToM. Patients with passivity 
symptoms, (delusions of alien control, and thought insertion) are predicted to perform 
normally on ToM tasks because they are impaired only in their ability to represent their 
own mental states, with their representations of those of other people being relatively 
preserved (Pickup & Frith, 2001).
Studies published prior to 2003
There have been two recent reviews of the pre-2003 literature pertaining to mentalizing 
abilities in schizophrenia, both of which conclude that there is good empirical evidence 
that ToM is impaired in people with schizophrenia relative to healthy controls (Brune, 
2005a; Harrington, Siegert et al., 2005). This impairment is evident across a range of 
verbal and non-verbal tasks and the reviewers agree that it is a specific deficit that 
cannot be accounted for purely in terms of impairment in executive or more general
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cognitive functioning. Findings relating to the association between ToM impairment 
and particular symptoms of schizophrenia are however more equivocal.
Briine (2005a) concludes that the evidence supports Frith’s (1992) theory in that patients 
with negative behavioural symptoms such as avolition or social withdrawal, or positive 
behavioural symptoms such as incoherent or inappropriate speech, perform worst on 
ToM tasks across several studies (patients with prevailing negative symptoms are most 
severely impaired in ToM, particularly when their symptomatology resembles that of 
autism; Langdon et al., 1997). Patients who experience subjective symptoms of 
passivity such as thought insertion or delusions of alien control and patients in remission 
perform relatively normally on ToM tasks. However, Briine (2005a) argues, evidence 
regarding the nature of the ToM deficit in paranoid patients is inconclusive with some 
studies providing support for such an impairment and others failing to do so.
Harrington, Siegert et al. (2005) point to the failure of the majority of studies to control 
for the presence of other symptoms and are more conservative about the conclusions 
they draw from current research at a symptom and symptom-cluster level. They 
summarise the evidence as indicating that, in line with Frith’s account, the ToM deficit 
in schizophrenia is most consistently associated with behavioural signs, in particular 
thought disorder, and paranoid symptoms, and argue that the evidence is least 
convincing with regard to delusions and hallucinations.
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Studies published since 2003
More recent studies have produced findings consistent with the general conclusions of 
Briine (2005a) and Harrington, Siegert et al. (2005). Patients with schizophrenia have 
been shown to be impaired relative to healthy controls on a ToM questionnaire and a 
picture-sequencing task (Briine, 2005b; Briine & Bodenstein, 2005), on a revised version 
of the ‘Hinting Task’ (Corcoran, Mercer & Frith, 1995: Marjoram et al., 2005) and on 
the ‘Eyes Test’, which requires mental states to be identified from photographs of eyes 
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001: Kelemen, Erdelyi & Pataki, 
2005). Again, there is less consistency in findings with regard to specific symptoms or 
symptom clusters; the studies by Briine’s research group did not look specifically at 
associations at this level, Marjoram et al. (2005) found positive symptomatology 
(specifically hallucinations and delusions) to predict ToM performance, and in Keleman 
et al.’s (2005) study, performance correlated significantly only with negative symptoms.
Two recent studies have focused on the relationship between persecutory/paranoid 
delusions and ToM and the findings of both broadly support the existence of an 
association. Craig, Hatton, Craig and Bentall (2004) found patients with persecutory 
delusions to perform worse than healthy controls and not significantly differently from 
those with Asperger’s syndrome on both the Hinting Task and the Eyes Test and ToM 
performance was negatively related to scores on a measure of paranoia. Harrington, 
Langdon, Siegert and McClure (2005) measured performance on first- and second-order 
false-belief and deception stories and a non-verbal picture-sequencing task (Langdon & 
Coltheart, 1999). Patients with paranoid delusions performed significantly worse than 
both non-clinical controls and patients with non-paranoid schizophrenia on verbal ToM
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tasks, and verbal ToM scores were negatively correlated with severity of paranoid 
delusions. When the effect of illness duration was partialled out, these relationships 
remained significant for second-order but not first-order verbal ToM scores.
Accounting for inconsistent findings
Harrington, Langdon et al. (2005) suggest that three factors are important in accounting 
for inconsistency in findings regarding the relationship between ToM and paranoid 
symptoms: (1) variation in tasks employed to measure ToM; (2) different methods of 
grouping the heterogeneous symptoms of schizophrenia and (3) variables other than 
ToM that are important in determining symptoms. All o f these factors could equally 
account for the discrepancy in findings regarding the relationship of other symptoms or 
symptom clusters of schizophrenia to ToM impairment.
A further possible explanation, arising primarily out o f the paranoia literature, relates to 
Frith’s (1992) model in which paranoid symptoms are argued to be underpinned not by 
an inability to ascribe mental states to others but by a lack of capacity to use contextual 
information to make correct on-line inferences about these mental states. Frith (2004) 
elaborates on this theory suggesting that patients with paranoid symptoms tend to ‘over- 
mentalize’, imputing mental states excessively. Traditional ToM tasks do not look 
specifically at abnormalities in the nature o f mentalizing abilities but focus on detecting 
the presence or absence of ToM per se. Nor do they take full account of the influence of 
context on mentalizing, or distinguish between on-line and off-line processes. Such 
tasks may therefore be too crude to fully explore differences in mentalizing style 
associated with particular symptoms of schizophrenia.
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The role o f context
The claim that patients with paranoid delusions have difficulty in drawing on contextual 
information in mentalizing gains support from the findings of a study comparing patients 
from different symptom groups and psychiatric and non-clinical controls in their 
understanding of pragmatics (Corcoran & Frith, 1996). In this study, patients with 
paranoid delusions were able to recognise appropriate use of conversational rules but 
were impaired relative to both control groups in recognising violations of politeness, 
which, it was argued, required reference to contextual information. Those with negative 
behavioural signs were impaired at recognising violations o f both conversational rules 
and politeness. Beyond this, little attention has been paid to the possible influence of 
contextual information on mentalizing abilities.
The on-line/off-line distinction
ToM tasks generally assess off-line mentalizing. One recent study (McCabe, Leudar & 
Antaki, 2004) looked at on-line abilities by analysing the conversational style of patients 
with schizophrenia talking to mental health professionals. The patient group evidenced 
an ability to use ToM skills (i.e. showing an appreciation o f others’ mental states as 
distinct from their own). However, no comparisons were made between the 
conversational styles of patients with different symptoms and again the study focused 
more on detecting an absence of mentalizing than on looking for differences in 
mentalizing style. Frith (2004) accounts for the findings by suggesting that ToM 
impairment in schizophrenia might be specific to explicit (off-line), conscious reflection 
upon states of mind, citing the difficulty the group with schizophrenia had when 
confronted with the problem of how to change someone’s belief as evidence. Beyond
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this there has been little consideration of the on-line/off-line distinction in the ToM and 
schizophrenia literature.
Difference versus deficit
As mentioned above, few studies have attempted to distinguish between absence of 
mentalizing abilities and abnormalities in mentalizing style. Abu-Akel and Bailey 
(2000) distinguish three types of ToM deficit: having no representational understanding 
of mental states, having representational understanding of mental states but a deficit in 
application of this understanding and having representational understanding of mind but 
over-attributing mental states or over-generating hypotheses about mental life. Abu- 
Akel (1999) suggests that the positive symptoms of schizophrenia (specifically, paranoid 
delusions and positive thought disorder) may be explained by a ‘hyper-mentalizing’ 
account. This relates to Frith’s (2004) suggestion that paranoid delusions might arise 
from a tendency to ‘over-mentalize’ and fits with the Garety, Hemsley and Wessely’s 
(1991) theory of delusion formation as arising from a reasoning bias in which 
conclusions are reached on the basis of less information than in ‘normal’ reasoning.
Frith (2004) suggests that, although a detailed error analysis might reveal different kinds 
o f error, over-mentalizing would be most clearly demonstrated if individuals could be 
shown to ascribe intentions to behaviour that most people would describe as mechanical 
or random. Blakemore, Sarfati, Bazin and Decety (2003) found that patients with 
delusions of persecution, but not patients without such delusions or non-clinical controls, 
tended to give an equal rating to the strength of relationship between the movement of 
two ‘animate’ shapes regardless of whether the movement was designed to be contingent
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or non-contingent. They also tended to ascribe mental states to the shapes when 
describing these relationships. Evidently, there is a need for further studies that allow 
for investigation of the tendency of paranoid patients to over-mentalize.
Conclusions on ToM & schizophrenia
It is clear that some patients with schizophrenia are impaired relative to the non-clinical 
population on some measures of ToM. The nature of the mentalizing differences 
underpinning this is unclear; it would seem that while the majority o f studies focus on 
the presence or absence of mentalizing abilities, such a dichotomy may be too simplistic 
to account for all the observed differences between psychotic patients and non-clinical 
controls and over-mentalizing may be implicated in some cases (e.g. in patients with 
paranoid delusions). Variation in mentalizing abilities appears likely to be dependent 
not only on the symptom profile of the individual patient but also on the context in 
which mentalizing is being observed, including the level of explicitness of mentalizing 
demanded by the task. This may relate to the fractionation of mentalizing abilities 
discussed by Fonagy et al. (2002). Nonetheless, the evidence points towards differences 
in mentalizing style associated with the psychotic state. It is therefore worth 
investigating abnormalities in ToM as a potential risk factor for psychosis in the non- 
clinical population.
22
2. The Remission Literature
An account that cites ToM differences as a risk factor for psychosis would predict such 
differences to be evident in remitted patients. Atypical mentalizing in remitted patients 
is not necessarily inconsistent with a view that mentalizing differences are solely a 
symptom of the psychotic state, as residual effects o f changes initially arising as part of 
psychotic illness may remain when the illness is in remission; however, such differences 
are a requirement of trait-based accounts. Studies investigating the ToM abilities of 
patients with schizophrenia when in remission have produced mixed findings.
Evidence consistent with a trait-based account
There is evidence to suggest that impaired mentalizing can be detected amongst remitted 
patients as compared to non-clinical controls, at least on some measures of ToM 
(Herold, Tenyi, Lenard & Trixler, 2002; Janssen, Krabbendam, Jolles & van Os, 2003; 
Kelemen et al., 2005). In Janssen et al.’s (2003) study, remitted patients with diagnoses 
of schizophrenia or schizo-affective disorder performed worse on the Hinting Task than 
non-psychotic first-degree relatives of psychotic patients, who in turn performed worse 
than healthy controls, even after controlling for general cognitive ability, 
neuropsychological measures (executive functions, episodic memory, verbal fluency, 
speed and attention) and sub-clinical psychopathology. On a first-order false-belief task, 
a non-significant trend was seen towards a similar relationship. The authors suggest that 
these findings reflect the lesser sensitivity of the false-belief task, as compared to the 
Hinting Task, in detecting ToM impairment. This argument is supported by the superior 
performance of the sample as a whole on the false-belief task relative to the Hinting
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Task, which suggests that the latter task may have been easier (although the authors do 
not report whether this difference was significant.)
Herold et al. (2002) used four measures to compare ToM in patients with paranoid 
schizophrenia in remission and non-psychiatric controls matched for sex, age, ethnic 
origin, and socio-economic and educational status. There was a non-significant trend 
towards worse performance on a first- and a second-order false-belief task amongst 
remitted patients as compared with controls, and no significant group difference in 
scores on a task requiring understanding of metaphor (a ceiling effect may have 
prevented detection of group differences on this measure.) On an irony task, however, 
remitted patients performed significantly worse than controls. Decoding irony requires 
consideration of the mental representations of the speaker about those of another, so that 
sense can be made of an utterance that blatantly contradicts the conversational context. 
In this way, the irony task is argued to relate to second-order ToM abilities.
Kelemen et al. (2005) also detected a mentalizing deficit in remitted patients relative to 
healthy controls using a sophisticated measure of ToM. The task employed was the 
Eyes Test, which has been shown to be sensitive enough to detect mild ToM 
impairments in high functioning patients with autism and Asperger syndrome (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 2001). One strength of Kelemen et al.’s (2005) study is that the remitted 
patient group were unmedicated for four weeks prior to testing, ensuring that differences 
in performance were not due to the effects of medication. The findings of this study, 
and of that of Herold et al. (2002), are limited by failure to control for sub-clinical 
psychopathology; however, when these are taken together with Janssen et al.’s (2003)
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findings, the evidence indicates that mentalizing differences between remitted patients 
and healthy controls can be detected when tests of more sophisticated ToM abilities are 
employed.
Evidence specific to paranoia
The reports o f Randall, Corcoran, Day and Bentall (2003) and Drury, Robinson and 
Birchwood (1998) provide evidence more specifically for an association between 
paranoid symptoms and ToM impairment in remission. In the former study, the 
performance of remitted paranoid patients on first- and second-order false-belief tasks 
was comparable to that of acute paranoid patients, with both groups performing 
significantly worse than healthy controls. No comparison group o f psychotic patients 
without paranoid symptoms was included in the study. Drury et al.’s (1998) longitudinal 
study, by contrast, included both paranoid and non-paranoid patients. These researchers 
found that, while all patients differed from non-schizophrenic psychiatric controls in 
their performance on second-order false-belief tasks when in the acute phase of illness, 
when the same patients were in remission the difference persisted only for those with 
persecutory delusions. Sub-clinical psychopathology was not controlled for in either of 
these studies.
Evidence against a trait-based account
A series o f experiments by Corcoran, Frith and colleagues are unsupportive of any 
abnormalities in mentalizing amongst patients with schizophrenia in remission 
(Corcoran et al., 1995, 1996, 1997; Frith & Corcoran, 1996; Pickup & Frith, 2001). 
These studies employed a range of ToM tasks and each included a remitted group
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alongside patient and healthy control groups. None found evidence for ToM impairment 
amongst remitted patients relative to controls. Harrington, Siegert et al. (2005) suggest 
that the strength of this evidence is equivocal, as the make-up of the schizophrenic 
subgroups appears to have been very similar across each of the studies, raising the 
possibility that samples comprised many of the same participants.
A further possible explanation for the discrepancies between the various findings 
discussed above is that the number of remitted patients included in the studies of 
Corcoran and Frith’s research group was too small for an effect to be detected. In two 
studies (Corcoran et al., 1997; Corcoran & Frith, 1996) remitted patients were 
incorporated into a single group with those with atypical symptoms in isolation and in 
the remaining three studies the remitted group consisted o f only eight or nine 
participants (Corcoran et al., 1995; Frith & Corcoran, 1996; Pickup & Frith, 2001.) This 
contrasts to a group of 20 remitted patients in Herold et al.’s (2002) study, 17 in 
Kelemen et al.’s (2005) study and 43 in that of Janssen et al. (2003). The equivalent 
sample size in the Randall et al. (2003) and Drury et al. (1998) studies, both of which 
found evidence for ToM differences associated with paranoid symptoms in remission 
only, is 14. It may therefore be that the effect size of the deficit seen in remitted patients 
is smaller than that seen in those in the acute phase of illness and that the sample sizes in 
the studies by Corcoran and Frith’s research group were too small to detect an effect.
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Conclusions on the remission literature
Taken together, the evidence suggests that differences in ToM between remitted patients 
and controls may be identifiable when tests o f more sophisticated mentalizing abilities 
are used, most markedly in those whose illness includes paranoid symptoms. However, 
the effect size is likely to be smaller than that seen in patients in the acute phase of 
illness. It is important to note that in most of the above studies patients continued to be 
on medication when in remission and in this way effects o f any trait marker are 
confounded with possible effects of medication. Furthermore, as discussed above, a 
ToM deficit consistently seen in remitted patients does not exclude the possibility that 
mentalizing differences arise as a result of the psychotic experience or associated 
distress. This is a particular consideration given that many of the remitted patients in the 
above studies were experiencing sub-clinical psychopathology and most of the studies 
did not control for this. The observation of persistent ToM deficits in paranoid patients 
in particular may reflect the fact that paranoid psychopathology leaves a more prominent 
shadow in the remission phase than do other symptoms. Therefore, evidence from the 
remission literature does not contradict a risk/trait marker view of the role of mentalizing 
differences in psychosis but neither does it provide any firm support for such a view.
3. Links to Other Biological and Environmental Risk Factors
Associations between known biological and environmental risk factors for psychosis and 
the atypical development of ToM provide additional reason to speculate a link between 
mentalizing style and vulnerability to psychosis.
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Frith and Frith (1991) discuss the relationship between psychosis and autism, noting 
similarities between social and communicative impairments symptomatic of both. It is 
on the basis o f these similarities that Frith (1992) proposes that abnormalities in ToM, 
posited to underpin the triad of social, imaginative and communicative deficits definitive 
of autism (Frith, Morton & Leslie, 1991; Wing & Gould, 1979), might also explain 
psychotic symptoms, with differences between the two disorders explained primarily in 
terms of difference in age of onset.
Autism is generally accepted to arise from a biological dysfunction, one potential 
candidate being a disturbance in the dopamine system (Damasio & Maurer, 1978). 
Dopamine dysfunction has been implicated in schizophrenia and blockade of the D2 
receptor is a necessary and sufficient condition for antipsychotic activity (e.g. see Kapur, 
Mizrahi & Li, 2005; Walker et al., 2004). Although it is likely that a wide variety of 
biological causes are implicated in both disorders and epidemiological and genetic 
studies point to differences in the aetiology o f the two (Frith & Frith, 1991), it is 
possible that commonalities also exist. The considerable co-morbidity and diagnostic 
overlap between autism and schizophrenia (Brereton & Bruce, 2002; Konstantareas & 
Hewitt, 2001) further indicates that this might be the case.
As discussed above, studies of ToM abilities in schizophrenia have found a mentalizing 
deficit to be most consistently associated with the more autistic features of the disorder 
(Langdon et al., 1997) and a distinction has been drawn in the literature between an 
autistic-like ToM deficit associated with negative symptoms and a more specific 
deviation in on-line mentalizing underpinning paranoia (e.g. Corcoran & Frith, 1996;
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Frith, 2004). Negative symptoms in particular are associated with abnormalities in 
social functioning in childhood, prior to the onset of schizophrenic disorder (e.g. Hollis, 
2003). It therefore seems there are grounds to postulate that the negative symptoms of 
schizophrenia specifically may be associated with a deficit in ToM arising from an 
autistic-like biological vulnerability present from birth.
Associations between environmental risk factors for psychosis and the abnormal 
development of ToM suggest a second possible route through which abnormal 
mentalizing might develop in the psychosis-prone. Risk factors related to early social 
environment and disrupted attachment are of particular relevance here. Separation from 
parents at a young age is predictive of positive symptoms of psychosis (Mednick, Parnas 
& Schulsinger, 1987), and children who report a negative relationship with their parents 
are especially likely to develop schizophrenia symptoms in general (Schiffman et al., 
2002). Unwantedness of pregnancy (Myhrman, Rantakallio, Isohanni, Jones & 
Partanen, 1996), ante-natal depression, poor mothering (Jones, Rodgers, Murray & 
Marmot, 1994) and early parental loss (Agid et al., 1999) have all been associated with 
increased risk of schizophrenia; and there is a growing body o f evidence for a 
relationship between physical abuse, sexual abuse or neglect and the later development 
of psychosis, and especially hallucinations, even after controlling for confounding 
variables at baseline (Bebbington et al., 2004; Janssen et al., 2004; Read, 1997; Read, 
van Os, Morrison & Ross, 2005; Whitfield, Dube, Felitti & Anda, 2005).
As discussed above, there is also considerable evidence for the influence of the early 
social environment on ToM development. In particular, insecurely attached children
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have been shown to be impaired relative to their securely attached peers in their ability 
to reason about mental states in both longitudinal and cross-sectional studies (e.g. 
Fonagy, Redfem & Charman, 1997; Fonagy, Steele, Steele & Holder, 1997; Meins, 
Femyhough, Russell & Clark-Carter, 1998). Fonagy et al. (2002) describe how abusive 
early parenting can lead to the suppression of mentalizing abilities as in this context the 
mental states o f others are terrifying and unbearable to consider. Therefore it is possible 
to see how abnormal mentalizing may play a mediating role between early experiences 
of neglect, abuse and disrupted attachment and the later development o f psychosis and 
perhaps positive symptoms in particular.
The possible impact of anxiety on mentalizing is also worth consideration. There is 
evidence that aspects of cognitive functioning vary with anxiety (Braunstein-Bercovitz, 
Rammsayer, Gibbons & Lubow, 2002) and it is therefore a possibility that mentalizing 
abilities can be affected when an individual becomes anxious. Stressful life events are 
implicated in both the onset of initial psychotic symptomatology and in the return of 
psychotic episodes (Bebbington et al., 1996; Day, 1981; Ventura, Nuechterlein, Lukoff 
& Hardesty, 1989) and psychotic symptoms and the treatment protocols commonly 
encountered by those experiencing them (e.g. seclusion and involuntary treatment) are 
both associated with high levels of distress (Shaw, McFarlane, Bookless & Air, 2002). 
It is possible that a decline in mentalizing associated with the anxiety provoked by these 
stressful experiences becomes problematic for those with existing atypical mentalizing 
styles, precipitating a psychotic breakdown. Additionally or alternatively, it is possible 
that distress associated with the experience of psychosis itself (further) impairs ToM 
abilities once a psychotic episode has set in.
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EVIDENCE FOR AND AGAINST A TRAIT-BASED ACCOUNT
1. Longitudinal Studies
If atypical mentalizing is indeed a risk factor for psychosis, ToM abnormalities in 
childhood will be predictive of the later development of psychosis. A single 
longitudinal study has looked at ToM as a predictor of later diagnostic outcome 
(Schiffman et al., 2004a).
In Schiffman et al.’s (2004a) study, a large sample of high-risk children (with at least 
one parent with a diagnosis of schizophrenia) and matched controls (children with a 
parent with a diagnosis o f other psychopathology and children with no parental records 
of psychiatric hospitalisation) aged ten to thirteen were administered Feffer’s ‘Role- 
Taking Task’ (Feffer, 1959). This task requires participants to retell stories taking the 
perspective o f one of the story characters. The scoring criteria ascribe higher scores to 
responses indicating greater ability to differentiate the perspectives of various story 
characters with the most points awarded to answers incorporating inference of feelings 
from observation of external events. This measurement captures the ability to infer 
mental states of others and is therefore argued by the authors to approximate typical 
conceptualisations of ToM.
At follow-up, 31 years later, diagnostic outcomes were obtained from interviews and/or 
hospital records. Children who later developed schizophrenia spectrum disorders 
(excluding schizophrenia) and those who later developed schizophrenia were found to
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have significantly lower role-taking task scores than those with an outcome of no mental 
illness and this association remained after controlling for age and verbal IQ. No 
significant difference was found between the schizophrenia spectrum disorder group and 
the ‘other psychopathology’ control group in role-taking task scores. However, the 
scores of the other psychopathology group fell between the scores of the schizophrenia 
spectrum and no mental illness outcome groups. The authors argue that, given the small 
sample size, a lack of power may have contributed to null findings in the comparison 
between schizophrenia spectrum and other psychopathology groups.
Two longitudinal studies looking at social functioning in general (to which ToM abilities 
contribute) as a predictor of psychiatric outcome are o f some relevance here (Done, 
Crow, Johnstone & Sacker, 1994; Schiffman et al., 2004b). In the cohort studied by 
Done et al. (1994) individuals who had received a diagnosis o f schizophrenia by the age 
of 28 were significantly impaired relative to non-clinical controls on teacher-rated 
measures of social adjustment taken at ages 7 and 11, although there were differences 
between the sexes in the form this maladjustment took. Similarly, Schiffman et al. 
(2004b) found that ratings on a measure o f sociability derived from analysis of 
videotaped interactions of 11 to 13 year-old children were lower for those who had 
received diagnoses of schizophrenia 20 years later than for those who had developed 
other psychiatric disorders or no psychiatric disorder at all. There is therefore evidence 
for social impairment manifest long before illness develops in those vulnerable to 
psychosis.
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These findings support the hypothesis that abnormalities in ToM and in social 
functioning in general are a pre-existing trait marker o f vulnerability to schizophrenia. 
However, both sets of findings are preliminary and there is a need for replication of the 
former using more conventional measures of ToM. A further limitation of Schiffman et 
al.’s (2004a) study is its failure to control for executive function deficits, which have 
been shown to be associated with psychosis-proneness (e.g. Raine, Sheard, Reynolds & 
Lencz, 1992) and may account for the poorer performance of high-risk individuals on 
the perspective-taking task.
2. Cross-Sectional Relative Studies
The existence of mentalizing differences in relatives o f those with schizophrenia (who 
share genetic and usually environmental influences with patients diagnosed with 
schizophrenia) as compared to those without a relative with psychosis would support the 
hypothesis that ToM deficits seen in patients with schizophrenia are rooted in 
characteristics of the psychosis-prone state. The few existing cross-sectional relative 
studies report inconsistent findings.
Two studies provide support for differences in ToM amongst healthy relatives of 
patients with schizophrenia. Wykes, Hamid and Wagstaff (2001) report preliminary 
findings of significantly poorer performance amongst non-psychotic siblings of people 
with schizophrenia as compared to healthy controls on a range of ToM tests, even after 
controlling for executive function. Similarly, Janssen et al.’s (2003) study (discussed
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above) found that first-degree relatives of patients with schizophrenia were impaired 
relative to non-psychotic controls on the Hinting Task, after controlling for executive 
functions, episodic memory, verbal fluency, performance speed, attention and sub- 
clinical psychopathology. The relative group in this study also made more errors than 
controls on a false-belief task but this association was not significant.
Related to these findings are those of a number of studies which do not directly examine 
mentalizing differences in those at risk for schizophrenia but which show abnormalities 
in the natural speech of non-psychotic relatives of patients with schizophrenia 
(Docherty, 1993; Docherty, Miller & Lewis, 1997; Docherty, Rhinewine, Labhart & 
Gordinier, 1998). For example, Docherty et al. (1998) compared speech samples from 
healthy parents of patients with schizophrenia to those of patients with schizophrenia, 
and of control participants with no history of psychiatric hospitalisation in themselves 
and with offspring with no psychotic illness. The parent group scored significantly 
lower than the control group on five out o f the six types o f referential communication 
disturbance that were rated. They scored no differently from the patient group on all but 
one referential communication disturbance type. Correct usage of referential terms is 
dependent on accurate representation and consideration of the mental state of the other. 
These findings are therefore consistent with the hypothesis that mentalizing style is 
abnormal in those at risk for schizophrenia.
At odds with the findings of the above studies are those of Kelemen, Keri, Must, 
Benedek and Janka (2004). These researchers found no evidence for impaired ToM in 
unaffected first-degree relatives of schizophrenia patients. Their study employed the
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Eyes Test as a measure of ToM and controlled for age, IQ and sex. The sample size was 
large comprising 65 unaffected relatives and 40 healthy controls. This compares to 41 
non-psychotic first-degree relatives and 43 healthy controls in Janssen et al.’s (2003) 
study above, and 17 remitted patients and 30 healthy controls in a study by Kelemen et 
al. (2005) that found a significant difference in performance on the same Eyes Test 
between remitted patients and healthy controls. It is therefore unlikely that the failure of 
this study to find an effect was due to a lack of power.
The findings from relative studies are preliminary; there is some indication that 
differences in mentalizing can be detected, on some ToM paradigms, between non- 
psychotic relatives of patients with schizophrenia and healthy controls, supporting the 
case for an association between vulnerability to schizophrenia and some differences in 
mentalizing. However, the differences do not seem to be detectable on all measures of 
ToM and studies to date give no indication as to which symptoms or symptom clusters 
are associated with differences in ToM function amongst relatives.
It is important to note that, in both longitudinal and cross-sectional studies involving 
relatives of individuals with schizophrenia, the influence of living in a family with a 
psychotic relative on characteristics of individual difference is confounded with that of 
possible predisposing traits. Observed differences in mentalizing ability may arise from 
the effects of living in an environment with a psychotic family member, or they may 
constitute markers of risk associated with shared genetic and environmental influences, 
or both may be the case. Studies that draw on schizotypy scores to discriminate between 
high- and low-risk groups avoid this confound to some extent.
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3. Cross-Sectional Schizotypy Studies
Trait-based accounts of the ToM differences seen in schizophrenia predict an association 
between schizotypy scores and performance on tests o f ToM. In this field also, the few 
relevant studies have produced mixed findings.
A series of experiments by Langdon and Coltheart employing a single participant group 
(Langdon & Coltheart, 1999, 2001) found associations between high schizotypy scores 
(categorised according to a median split o f total scores on the SPQ) and mentalizing 
performance. In two experiments within Langdon and Coltheart’s (1999) study, high 
schizotypes scored lower than low schizotypes in the ToM condition o f a picture- 
sequencing task. The two groups performed comparably on control conditions involving 
reasoning about social scripts and mechanical scenarios, and on a more difficult 
condition in which they had to avoid being misled by cognitively salient but irrelevant 
information. They also performed comparably on a measure of executive planning. The 
poorer performance o f low schizotypes on the ToM condition was not therefore 
explicable in terms of general difficulty in reasoning, understanding social scripts, 
disengaging from salient distracters or entertaining states that run counter to reality.
Langdon and Coltheart (2001) found differences between high and low schizotypes in 
how alternative perspectives were considered. In a perspective-taking task, high 
schizotypes, but not low schizotypes, were significantly faster and more accurate at 
making judgements about the appearance of a rotated array than they were at making 
judgements about the appearance of the array by imagining an alternative viewing
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perspective. Furthermore, high schizotypes tended to be slower and less accurate than 
low schizotypes at making judgements that involved considering an alternative viewing 
position, but faster and more accurate at making array rotation decisions (although these 
differences were not significant). Performance under viewer rotation but not array 
rotation instruction tended to predict mentalizing ability as measured by Langdon and 
Coltheart (1999).
In terms of associations between individual schizotypal traits and ToM impairment, the 
two separate experiments within Langdon and Coltheart’s (1999) study produced 
inconsistent findings. Traits associated with negative symptoms of schizophrenia were 
associated with poorer performance in one experiment and those analogous to positive 
symptoms were associated with poorer performance in the other. Langdon and Coltheart 
(2001) found a non-significant tendency towards an association between high ratings o f 
cognitive-perceptual and disorganised schizotypal traits and greater response times in 
judging the appearance of an array from an alternative viewing perspective.
There is also evidence for differences in language usage and understanding associated 
with total schizotypy scores (Docherty, 1993; Docherty et al., 1998; Langdon & 
Coltheart, 2004). Docherty et al.’s (1998) study (discussed above) found that, amongst 
the healthy parents of children with schizophrenia, those scoring highly on the Schedule 
of Schizotypal Personalities (Baron, Asnis & Gruen, 1981) evidenced significantly 
greater communication deviance (e.g. use o f ambiguous referents) in their expressive 
language than did low scorers, perhaps indicating less accurate representation of the 
mental states of interlocutors amongst high schizotypes.
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In Langdon and Coltheart’s (2004) study high-schizotypal adults were impaired relative 
to low schizotypal adults (categorised on the basis of a median split of total SPQ scores) 
at identifying appropriate ironical speech acts. This pattern persisted after controlling 
for the ability to integrate and recall story information. As discussed above, decoding 
irony relies on consideration of mental states and so these findings can be taken to 
support an association between schizotypy and abnormalities in mentalizing. However, 
this study also produced the unexpected finding that high schizotypes were relatively 
poor at judging the appropriateness of literal statements. This result is difficult to 
account for.
In contrast to the above findings, three studies have found no evidence for an association 
between total schizotypy score and poorer performance on mentalizing tasks (Lippett, 
2004; Pickup, 2006; Young & Mason, 2006). Young and Mason (2006) found no 
difference in the performance of those high or low in either total schizotypy or in any of 
its dimensions (categorised by a median split o f O-LIFE scores) on any of three tasks: 
the picture sequencing task used by Langdon and Coltheart (1999), the ‘Faux Pas Task’ 
(Gregory et al., 2002) and the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Between them, 
these tasks tap all three of the mental state attribution abilities identified by Stone et al. 
(2003). The sample size in this study (N=60) was larger than that in Langdon and 
Coltheart’s (1999, 2001) experiments making it unlikely that null findings are explicable 
purely in terms of a lack of power.
Pickup (2006) found no significant association between total schizotypy score and 
mentalizing ability and no group difference in ToM between high and low schizotypes
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(categorised according to a median split on schizotypy scores), using the O-LIFE 
questionnaire as a measure of schizotypy and assessing ToM using Fletcher et al.’s 
(1995) Stories Task. At the level of symptom related traits, however, Pickup (2006) 
found scores on the ToM condition of the Stories Task to be significantly predicted by 
the ‘Unusual Experiences’ dimension of the O-LIFE which measures aspects of 
schizotypy associated with the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. This association 
remained after controlling for both verbal IQ and executive function and was 
independent of scores on a control condition testing reasoning about physical causation 
rather than mental states.
The sample size in Pickup’s study was 62 (larger than that o f both Langdon and 
Coltheart’s (1999, 2001) studies) and a novel sampling strategy was used, employing a 
screening questionnaire to ensure that high and low schizotypes were well represented in 
the sample. It therefore seems unlikely that the failure to detect a significant difference 
between the mentalizing abilities of high and low schizotypes was due to lack of power 
arising from too small a sample. However, Pickup suggests that the effect size may have 
been greater had the stories been read aloud to participants so that scenarios had to be 
processed on-line. This would constitute a more sensitive test of ToM than the paradigm 
employed in his study, which permitted participants to take as much time as they needed 
to read and understand the stories.
In a study which allowed for the identification of differences in mentalizing style beyond 
a simple deficit, Lippett (2005) compared the performance of 23 low and 17 high 
schizotypes with STA scores at least one standard deviation below or above the mean
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respectively on Abell et al.’s (2000) ‘Triangles Task’. (STA scores represent a 
composite measure of schizotypy that can be derived from the O-LIFE questionnaire.) 
In this task, participants are asked to describe what is happening in animations involving 
two geometric shapes. The movement of the shapes is either random, or suggestive of a 
mechanical relationship between the two (‘goal-directed’ condition) or designed to elicit 
an explanation that refers to mental states (‘ToM ’ condition). Lippett found 
performance of high and low schizotypal groups to be comparable in ToM and goal- 
directed conditions. However, in the ‘random’ condition, the responses of high 
schizotypes were less accurate than those of low schizotypes and there was a significant 
tendency for those with high scores on the cognitive perceptual factor of the SPQ (the 
subscale closest to positive symptoms o f psychosis) to give less appropriate responses. 
In this condition the responses of high schizotypes tended to refer to some kind of 
purposeful interaction, and were thought to be suggestive of a “tendency to impute 
social meaning when there is none”. Unlike Pickup (2006), Lippett (2005) did not 
control for either IQ or executive function, both of which may affect ToM performance.
It therefore seems that although abnormalities of mentalizing can be demonstrated in 
high as compared to low schizotypes on some tasks, they cannot be detected on all 
measures of ToM, and a simple deficit in ToM associated with psychosis-proneness 
alone or with any trait related to a particular schizophrenic symptom or symptom cluster 
may be too simplistic to account for the data. It seems that a tendency to over-mentalize 
may characterise the thinking of some high schizotypes, at least in some contexts.
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It is notable that other areas of vulnerability research have produced evidence for 
associations between schizotypy and differences rather than deficits in aspects cognitive 
style. Most notably, there is considerable evidence for a positive relationship between 
psychosis-proneness and creative thinking (e.g. Burch, Pavelis, Hemsley & Corr, 2006; 
Eysenck & Fumham, 1993; Green & Williams, 1999). Green and Williams (1999), for 
example, assessed creativity using a divergent thinking task and found a positive 
association between the number of ‘original’ responses generated in this task and overall 
score on the STA. Folley and Park (2005) found high schizotypes (identified on the 
basis of scores on the SPQ) to perform better than low schizotypes (and patients with 
schizophrenia) on an alternative measure of divergent thinking and, furthermore, 
demonstrated a neurological underpinning to this difference in performance. Across all 
participants, divergent thinking was associated with enhanced bilateral prefrontal 
cortical activity; however, the superior creative thinking seen in high schizotypes was 
associated with activation of the right prefrontal cortex particularly.
Differences in cognitive style associated with schizotypy have also been evidenced in 
reasoning tasks (Young & Mason, in press; Sellen, Oaksford & Gray, 2005). 
Furthermore, in Young and Mason’s (in press) study, evidence was found for the context 
dependence o f differences in reasoning style. High scorers on the ‘Introvertive 
Anhedonia’ subscale of the O-LIFE measure of schizotypy were compromised in 
deductive reasoning specifically when reasoning about personally relevant emotional 
statements. Future studies of the relationship between psychosis-proneness and 
mentalizing could usefully investigate further the possibility of differences rather than 
deficits in mentalizing style and variability in these across contexts.
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CONCLUSIONS
A clear rationale for considering differences in ToM as a possible marker of risk for 
psychosis is presented in terms of the diathesis-stress model, continuity models of 
vulnerability to psychosis, evidence for ToM deficits in patients with schizophrenia, and 
associations between factors involved in the aetiology of schizophrenia and those 
implicated in abnormal ToM development in other disorders.
The evidence that ToM is impaired in those diagnosed with schizophrenia is convincing; 
however, the nature o f the impairment is unclear and is likely to be dependent not only 
on the symptom profile of the individual patient but also on the context in which 
mentalizing is being observed, including the level o f explicitness of mentalizing 
demanded by the task.
ToM deficits can also be observed in some patients with schizophrenia when in 
remission. Such deficits are not evident in all cases or on all measures of ToM and this 
variability needs to be accounted for. However, the remission literature does not rule 
out the possibility that atypical mentalizing may constitute a risk factor predisposing an 
individual to psychosis, rather than a symptom of the psychotic state.
The high-risk paradigm provides a structure for investigating risk factors for psychosis; 
the evidence from longitudinal relative studies, cross-sectional relative studies and cross- 
sectional schizotypy comparisons is reviewed.
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Longitudinal studies provide evidence in support of atypical mentalizing, and problems 
in social functioning in general, amongst those at risk for psychosis prior to illness onset; 
however, this evidence is preliminary and findings specific to ToM must be interpreted 
cautiously in view of limitations associated with the tasks employed.
Evidence from cross-sectional relative studies is again preliminary and is mixed. While 
there is some indication that differences in mentalizing can be detected, on some ToM 
paradigms, between non-psychotic relatives of patients with schizophrenia and healthy 
controls, these differences do not seem to be detectable on all measures of ToM.
Both cross-sectional and longitudinal high-risk studies drawing on relative groups suffer 
from the limitation that the possible influence of living in an environment with a 
psychotic relative cannot be separated from the existence of differences in mentalizing 
as a risk factor in their own right. Studies that draw on schizotypy scores to discriminate 
between high and low risk groups avoid this confound to some extent.
The evidence from the schizotypy literature indicates that differences in mentalizing can 
be detected in high as compared to low schizotypes; however, again these differences 
are not apparent on all tasks. Furthermore, there is mixed evidence pertaining to the 
associations between particular symptom-related traits and mentalizing abilities. One 
study in particular suggests that, as is the case with other aspects of cognitive function in 
the psychosis-prone, a deficit approach may be too simplistic. There is a need for 
further studies investigating other aspects of ToM difference, in particular the tendency 
to over-mentalize.
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Related to this point, consideration must be given to the conceptualisation of ToM and 
its measurement that underpins research into ToM and schizophrenia/psychosis- 
proneness. Generally, mentalizing is approached as if it is a unitary construct, which can 
be assessed with a wide array of measures. However, Harrington, Langdon et al. (2005) 
point out that this is unlikely to be the case. Not only is ToM a broad construct, but also 
variation in its nature is likely to exist between individuals in the non-clinical population 
and within individuals across contexts. The majority of studies to date fail to take 
account of these ideas. There is a need to investigate the relationship between 
mentalizing and psychosis-proneness using a range of ToM tasks, both verbal and non­
verbal, with attention paid to the extent to which tasks are ecologically valid and tap on­
line abilities in real time.
A number of notable questions relating to ToM and psychosis-proneness remain. If 
mentalizing differences do exist in non-psychotic individuals at risk of schizophrenia, 
there is a need to account for the discrepancy between these differences and the ToM 
impairment associated with the psychotic state. Possible explanations lie in the decline 
in other cognitive capacities, such as executive function, that might accompany the onset 
of schizophrenia. Alternatively, or in addition, a decline in mentalizing abilities 
associated with anxiety may contribute to further changes in ToM once illness manifests, 
as the experience of psychosis and its treatment is distressing.
Finally, the possible role of ToM in the pathogenesis o f psychotic illness requires further 
investigation. Atypical mentalizing may play a mediating role in the development of the 
psychotic state, or may constitute no more than a marker of those at risk.
44
REFERENCES
Abell, F., Happe, F. & Frith, U. (2000). Do triangles play tricks? Attribution of mental 
states to animated shapes in normal and abnormal development. Cognitive Development, 
15, 1-16.
Abu-Akel, A. (1999). Impaired theory of mind in schizophrenia. Pragmatics and 
Cognition, 7, 247-282.
Abu-Akel, A. & Bailey, A.L. (2000). Correspondence, Psychological Medicine, 30, 
735-738.
Agid, O., Shapira, B., Zislin, J., Ritsner, M., Hanin, B., Murad, H., Troudart, T., Bloch, 
M., Heresco-Levy, U. & Lerer, B. (1999). Environment and vulnerability to major 
psychiatric illness: a case control study of early parental loss in major depression, 
bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. Molecular Psychiatry, 4, 163-172.
Baron, M., Asnis, L. & Gruen, R. (1981). The Schedule for Schizotypal Personalities 
(SSP): A diagnostic interview for schizotypal features. Psychiatry Research, 4, 213- 
228.
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A.M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a 
“theory of mind”? Cognition, 21, 37-46.
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y. & Plumb, I. (2001). The ‘Reading 
the mind in the eyes’ test revised version: a study with normal adults, and adults with 
Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. Journal o f  Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 42, 241 -251.
45
Bebbington, P., Bhugra, D., Brugha, T., Singleton, N., Farrell, M., Jenkins, R. Lewis, G. 
& Howard, M. (2004). Psychosis, victimization and childhood disadvantage: evidence 
from the second British national Survey of Psychiatric Morbidity. British Journal o f  
Psychiatry, 185, 220-226.
Bebbington, P., Wilkins, S., Sham, P., Jones, P., van Os, J., Murray, R., Toone, B. & 
Lewis, S. (1996). Life events before psychotic episodes: Do clinical and social variables 
affect the relationship? Social Psychiatric Epidemiology, 31, 122-128
Blakemore, S.-J., Sarfati, Y., Bazin, N. & Decety, J. (2003). The detection of intentional 
contingencies in simple animations in patients with delusions of persecution. 
Psychological Medicine, 33, 1433-1441.
Braunstein-Bercovitz, H., Rammsayer, T., Gibbons, H. & Lubow, R.E. (2002). Latent 
inhibition deficits in high-schizotypal normals: symptom-specific or anxiety-related? 
Schizophrenia Research, 53, 109-121.
Brereton, A.V. & Bruce, J.T. (2002). Autism and related disorders in adults. Current 
Opinion in Psychiatry, 15, 483-487.
Brtine, M. (2005a). “Theory of mind” in schizophrenia: A review of the literature. 
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 31, 21-42.
Brtine, M. (2005b). Emotion recognition, ‘theory of mind’ and social behaviour in 
schizophrenia. Psychiatry Research, 133, 135-147.
46
Brtine, M. & Bodenstein, L. (2005). Proverb comprehension reconsidered -  ‘theory of 
mind’ and the pragmatic use of language in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 75, 
233-239.
Burch, S-J., Pavelis, C., Hemsley, D.R. & Corr, P.J. (2006). Schizotypy and creativity 
in visual artists. British Journal o f  Psychology, 97, 177-190.
Carpendale, J.I.M. & Lewis, C. (2004). Constructing an understanding of mind: the 
development of children’s social interaction with social interaction. Behavioural and 
Brain Sciences, 27, 79-151.
Carruthers, P. & Smith P.K. (1996). Theories of theories of mind. Cambridge 
University press, Cambridge, MA
Chapman, L.J., Chapman, J.P., Kwapil, T.R., Eckblad, M. & Zinser, M.C. (1994). 
Putatively psychosis-prone subjects 10 years later. Journal o f  Abnormal Psychology, 
103, 171-183.
Claridge, G. (1994). Single indicator of risk for schizophrenia: Probable fact or likely 
myth? Schizophrenia Bulletin, 20, 151-168.
Claridge, G. & Hewitt, J.K. (1987). A biometric study of schizotypy in a normal 
population. Personality and Individual Differences, 8, 303-312.
Claridge, G., McCreery, C., Mason, O., Bentall, R., Boyle, G., Slade, P. & Popplewell, 
D. (1996). The factor structure of ‘schizotypal’ traits: a large replication study. British 
Journal o f  Clinical Psychology, 35, 103-115.
47
Corcoran, R., Cahill, C. & Frith, C.D. (1997). The appreciation o f visual jokes in people 
with schizophrenia: a study of ‘mentalizing’ ability. Schizophrenia Research, 24, 319- 
327.
Corcoran, R. & Frith, C.D. (1996). Conversational conduct and the symptoms of 
schizophrenia. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 1, 305-318
Corcoran, R., Mercer, G. & Frith, C.D. (1995). Schizophrenia, symptomatology and 
social inference: Investigating “theory of mind” in people with schizophrenia. 
Schizophrenia Research, 77, 5-13.
Craig, J.S., Hatton, C., Craig, F.B. & Bentall, R.P. (2004). Persecutory beliefs, 
attributions and theory of mind: comparison of patients with paranoid delusions, 
Asperger’s syndrome and healthy controls. Schizophrenia Research, 69, 29-33.
Damasio, A.R. & Maurer, R.G. (1978). A neurological model for childhood autism. 
Archives o f  Neurology, 35, 777-786.
Davies, M., & Stone T. (1995). Folk psychology: The theory o f  mind debate. Oxford: 
Blackwell.
Day, R. (1981). Life events and schizophrenia: the “triggering” hypothesis. Acta 
Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 64, 97-122
de Rosnay, M. & Hughes, C. (2006). Conversation and theory o f mind: Do children talk 
their way to socio-cognitive understanding? British Journal o f  Developmental 
Psychology, 24,1-31.
48
Denham, S.A., Zoller, D. & Couchoud, E.A. (1994). Socialization of preschoolers’ 
emotion understanding. Developmental Psychology, 30, 928-936.
Dennett, D.C. (1978). Beliefs about beliefs. Behaviour and Brain Sciences, 4, 568-570.
Department of Health (2000). The NHS plan. A plan fo r  investment. A plan fo r  reform. 
London: Department of Health.
Department of Health (2001). The mental health policy implementation guide. London: 
Department of Health.
Docherty, N.M. (1993). Communication deviance, attention and schizotypy in parents 
o f schizophrenic patients. Journal o f  Nervous and Mental Disease, 181, 750-756.
Docherty, N.M., Miller, T.N. & Lewis, M.A. (1997). Communication disturbances in 
the natural speech of schizophrenic patients and non-schizophrenic parents of patients. 
Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 95, 500-507.
Docherty, N.M., Rhinewine, J.P., Labhart, R.P. & Gordinier, S.W. (1998). 
Communication disturbances and family psychiatric history in parents of schizophrenic 
patients. Journal o f  Nervous and Mental Disease, 186, 761-768.
Done, D.J., Crow, T.J., Johnstone, E.C. & Sacker, A. (1994). Childhood antecedents of 
schizophrenia and affective illness: social adjustment at age 7 and 11. British Medical 
Journal, 309, 699-703.
49
Drury, V.M., Robinson, E.J. & Birchwood, M. (1998). ‘Theory of mind’ skills during 
an acute episode of psychosis and following recovery. Psychological Medicine, 28, 
1101- 1112 .
Dunn, J., Brown, J.R., Slomkowski, C., Tesla, C., & Youngblade, L. (1991). Young 
children’s understanding of other people’s feelings and beliefs: Individual differences 
and their antecedents. Child Development, 62, 1352-1366.
Eysenck, H.J. & Fumham, A. (1993). Personality and the Barron-Welsh art scale. 
Perceptual and Motor Skills, 76, 837-838.
Feffer, M. (1959). The cognitive implications of role-taking behaviour. Journal o f  
Personality, 27, 152-168.
Fergusson, D.M., Poulton, R., Smith, P.F. & Boden, J.M. (2006). Cannabis and 
psychosis. British Medical Journal, 332, 172-176.
Fletcher, R.H., Fletcher, S.W. & Wagner, E.H., (1996). Clinical epidemiology: The 
essentials (3rd ed.). Baltimore, MD: Williams & Wilkins.
Fletcher, P.C., Happe, F., Frith, U., Baker, S.C., Dolan, R.J., Frackowiak, R.S.J. & Frith, 
C.D. (1995). Other minds in the brain: a functional imaging study of ‘theory of mind’ in 
story comprehension. Cognition, 57, 109-128.
Folley, B.S. & Park, S. (2005). Verbal creativity and schizotypal personality in relation 
to prefrontal hemispheric laterality: A behavioural and near-infrared optical imaging 
study. Schizophrenia Research, 80, 271-282.
50
Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E. & Target, M. (2002). Affect regulation, 
mentalization, and the development o f  the se lf New York: Other Press.
Fonagy, P., Redfem, S., & Charman, A. (1997). The relationship between belief-desire 
reasoning and a projective measure o f attachment security (SAT). British Journal o f  
Developmental Psychology, 15, 51-63.
Fonagy, P., Steele, H., Steele, M. & Holder, J. (1997). Attachment and theory of mind: 
overlapping constructs? Association fo r  child Psychology and Psychiatry, Occasional 
papers, 14, 31-40.
Frith, C.D. (1992). The cognitive neuropsychology o f  schizophrenia. Hove, UK: 
Lawrence Erlbaum associates.
Frith, C.D. (2004). Schizophrenia and theory of mind. Psychological Medicine, 34, 
385-389.
Frith, C.D. & Corcoran, R. (1996). Exploring ‘theory o f mind’ in people with 
schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine, 26, 521-530.
Frith, C.D. & Frith, U. (1991). Elective affinities in schizophrenia and childhood 
autism. In Bebbington, P. (Ed.), Social psychiatry. New Brunswick NJ: Transactions 
press.
Frith, U., Morton, J. & Leslie A.M. (1991). The cognitive basis o f a biological disorder: 
autism. Trends in Neuroscience, 14, 433-438.
51
Garety, P.A., Craig, T.K.J., Dunn, G., Fomells-Ambrojo, M. Colbert, S., Rahaman, N., 
Reed, J. & Power, P. (2006). Specialised care for early psychosis: symptoms, social 
functioning and patient satisfaction. British Journal o f  Psychiatry, 188, 37-45.
Garety, P.A., Hemsley, D.R., & Wessely, S. (1991). Reasoning in deluded 
schizophrenic and paranoid patients. Journal o f  Nervous and Mental Disease, 179, 194- 
201 .
Gottesman, 1.1. (1991). Schizophrenia Genesis. New York: W.H. Freeman.
Green, M.J. & Williams, L.M. (1999). Schizotypy and creativity as effects of reduced 
cognitive inhibition. Personality and Individual Differences, 27, 263-276.
Gregory, C., Lough, S., Stone, V., Erzinclioglu, S., Martin, L., Baron-Cohen, S. & 
Hodges, J.R. (2002). Theory of mind in patients with frontal variant fronto-temporal 
dementia and Alzheimer’s disease: Theoretical and practical implications. Brain, 125, 
752-764.
Harrington, L., Langdon, R., Siegert, R.J. & McClure, J. (2005). Schizophrenia, theory 
of mind and persecutory delusions. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 10, 87-104.
Harrington, L., Siegert, R.J. & McClure, J. (2005). Theory of mind in schizophrenia: A 
critical review. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 10, 249-286.
Herold, R., Tenyi, T., Lenard, K. & Trixler, M. (2002). Theory of mind deficit in people 
with schizophrenia during remission. Psychological Medicine, 32, 1125-1129.
52
Hollis, C. (2003). Developmental precursors of child- and adolescent-onset 
schizophrenia and affective psychoses: diagnostic specificity and continuity with 
symptom dimensions. British Journal o f  Psychiatry, 182, 37-44.
Hughes, C., Happe, F., Taylor, A., Jaffee, S.R., Caspi, A., & Moffitt, T.E. (2005). 
Origins of individual differences in theory of mind: From nature to nurture? Child 
Development, 76, 356-370.
Isohanni, M., Lauronen, E., Moilanen, K., Isohanni, I., Kemppainen, L., Koponen, H., 
Miettunen, J., Maki, P., Rasanen, S., Veijola, J., Tienari, P., Wahlberg, K.E. & Murray, 
G.K. (2005). Predictors of schizophrenia: Evidence from the northern Finland 1966 
birth cohort and other sources. British Journal o f  Psychiatry, 187 (suppl. 48), s4-s7.
Janssen, I., Krabbendam, L., Bak, M., Hanssen, M., Vollebergh, W., de Graaf, R. & van 
Os, J. (2004). Childhood abuse as a risk factor for psychotic experiences. Acta 
Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 109, 38-45.
Janssen, I., Krabbendam, L., Jolles, J. & van Os, J. (2003). Alterations in theory of mind 
in patients with schizophrenia and non-psychotic relatives. Acta Psychiatrica 
Scandinavica, 108, 110-117.
Johns, L.C. & van Os, J. (2001). The continuity o f psychotic experiences in the general 
population. Clinical Psychology Review, 21, 1125-1141.
Johns, L.C., Cannon, M., Singleton, N., Murray, R.M., Farrell, M., Brugha, T., 
Bebbington, P., Jenkins, R. & Meltzer, H. (2004). Prevalence and correlates of self-
53
reported psychotic symptoms in the British population. The British Journal o f  
Psychiatry, 185, 298-305.
Jones, P., Rodgers, B., Murray, R. & Marmot, M. (1994). Childhood developmental risk 
factors for schizophrenia in the British 1946 birth cohort. Lancet, 344, 1398-1402.
Kapur, S., Mizrahi, R. & Li, M. (2005). From dopamine to salience to psychosis -  
linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. Schizophrenia 
Research, 79, 59-68.
Kelemen, O., Erdelyi, R. & Pataki I. (2005). Theory of mind and motion perception in 
schizophrenia. Neuropsychology, 19, 494-500.
Kelemen, O., Keri, S., Must, A., Benedek, G. & Janka, Z. (2004). No evidence for 
impaired ‘theory of mind’ in unaffected first-degree relatives of schizophrenia patients. 
Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 110, 146-149.
Kendler, K.S. & Hewitt, J.K. (1992). The structure o f self-report schizotypy in twins. 
Journal o f  Personality Disorders, 6, 1-17.
Kendler, K.S., Ochs, A.L., Gorman, A.M., Hewitt, J.K., Ross, D.E. & Mirsky, A.F. 
(1991). The structure of schizotypy: A pilot multi-trait twin study. Psychiatry 
Research, 36, 19-36.
Konstantareas, M.M. & Hewitt, T. (2001). Autistic disorder and schizophrenia: 
Diagnostic overlaps. Journal o f  Autism and Developmental Disorders, 31, 19-28.
54
Langdon, R. & Coltheart, M. (1999). Mentalizing, schizotypy, and schizophrenia. 
Cognition, 7/, 43-71.
Langdon, R. & Coltheart, M. (2001). Visual perspective taking and schizotypy: 
Evidence for a simulation-based account of mentalizing in normal adults. Cognition, 82, 
1-26.
Langdon, R. & Coltheart, M. (2004). Recognition of metaphor and irony in young 
adults: the impact of schizotypal personality traits. Psychiatry Research, 125, 9-20.
Langdon, R., Michie, P.T., Ward, P.B., McConaghy, N., Catts, S.V., & Coltheart, M. 
(1997). Defective self and/or other mentalizing in schizophrenia: A neuropsychological 
approach. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 2, 167-193.
Larsen, T.K., Friis, S., Haahr, U., Joa, I., Johannessen, J.O., Melle, I., Opjordsmoen, S., 
Simonsen, E., Vaglum, P. (2001). Early detection and intervention in first-episode 
schizophrenia: a critical review. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 103, 323-334.
Lee, K.H., Farrow, T.F.D., Spence, S.A. & Woodruff, P.W.R. (2004). Social cognition, 
brain networks and schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine, 34, 391-400.
Leslie, A. (1987). Pretence and representation: The origins of ‘theory of mind.’
Psychological Review, 94, 412-426.
Lippett (2004). An investigation o f  the interaction between schizotypy and cognitive 
monitoring processes. Doctoral Thesis.
55
Malla, A.K., & Norman, R.M.G. (2002). Early intervention in schizophrenia and related 
disorders: advantages and pitfalls. Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 15, 17-23.
Marjoram, D., Gardner, C., Burns, J., Miller, P., Lawrie, S.M. & Johnstone, E.C. (2005). 
Symptomatology and social inference: A theory o f mind study of schizophrenia and 
psychotic affective disorder. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 10, 347-359.
Mason, O. & Claridge, G. (2006). The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and 
Experiences (O-LIFE): Further description and extended norms. Schizophrenia 
Research, 82, 203-211.
Mason, O., Claridge, G., & Jackson, M. (1995). New scales for the assessment of 
schizotypy. Personality and Individual Differences, 18, 7-13.
McCabe, R., Leudar, I., & Antaki, C. (2004). Do people with schizophrenia display 
theory o f mind deficits in clinical interactions? Psychological Medicine, 34, 401-412.
Mednick, S.A., Pamas, J. & Schulsinger, F. (1987). The Copenhagen high-risk project, 
1962-1986. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 13, 485-495.
Meehl, P.E. (1962). Schizotaxia, schizotypy, schizophrenia. American Psychologist 17, 
827-838.
Meins, E., Femyhough, C., Russell, J.A., & Clark-Carter, D. (1998). Security of 
attachment as a predictor of symbolic and mentalizing abilities: a longitudinal study. 
Social Development, 7, 1-24.
56
Myhrman, A., Rantakallio, P., Isohanni, M., Jones, P.B. & Partanen, U. (1996). Does 
unwantedness of a pregnancy predict schizophrenia? British Journal o f  Psychiatry, 169, 
637-640.
Pemer, J. (1991). Understanding the representational mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.
Petersen, L., Jeppesen, P., Thorup, A., Abel, M.B., 0hlenschlaeger, J., Christensen, T.
0 ., Krarup, G., Jorgensen, P. & Nordentoft, M. (2005). A randomised multi-centre trial 
of integrated versus standard treatment for patients with a first episode of psychotic 
illness. British Medical Journal, 331, 602-605.
Phillips, L.J., Yung, A.R. & McGorry, P.D. (2000). Identification of young people at 
risk of psychosis: validation of Personal Assessment and Crisis Evaluation Clinic intake 
criteria. Australian and New Zealand Journal o f  Psychiatry, 34 (suppl.), sl64-sl69.
Pickup, G. (2006). Theory of mind and its relation to schizotypy. Cognitive 
Neuropsychiatry, 11, 177-192.
Pickup, G. & Frith, C.D. (2001). Theory of mind impairments in schizophrenia: 
symptomatology, severity and specificity. Psychological Medicine, 31, 207-220.
Premack, D. & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have ‘a theory of mind’? 
Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 4, 515-526.
Raine, A. (1991). The SPQ: a scale for the assessment of schizotypal personality based 
on DSM-III-R criteria. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 17, 55-64.
57
Raine, A., Sheard, C., Reynolds, G.P. & Lencz, T. (1992). Prefrontal structural and 
functional deficits associated with individual differences in schizotypal personality. 
Schizophrenia Research, 7, 237-247.
Randall, F., Corcoran, R., Day, J. & Bentall, R.P. (2003). Attention, theory of mind, and 
causal attributions in people with persecutory delusions: A preliminary investigation. 
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 8, 287-294.
Read, J. (1997). Child abuse and psychosis: a literature review and implications for 
professional practice. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 28, 448-456.
Read, J., van Os, J., Morrison, A.P. & Ross, C.A. (2005). Childhood trauma, psychosis 
and schizophrenia: a literature review with theoretical and clinical implications. Acta 
Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 112, 330-350.
Rowe, A.D., Bullock, P.R., Polkey, C.E. & Morris, R.G. (2001). ‘Theory of mind’ 
impairments and their relationship to executive functioning following frontal lobe 
excision. Brain, 124, 600-616.
Schiffman, J., LaBrie, J., Carter, J., Tyrone, C., Schulsinger, F., Parnas J. & Mednick S. 
(2002). Perception of parent-child relationships in high-risk families, and adult 
schizophrenia outcome of offspring. Journal o f  Psychiatric Research, 36, 41-47.
Schiffman, J., Lam, C.W., Jiwatram, T., Ekstrom, M., Sorensen, H., & Mednick, S. 
(2004a). Perspective-taking deficits in people with schizophrenia spectrum disorders: A 
prospective investigation. Psychological Medicine, 34, 1581-1586.
58
Schiffman, J., Walker, E., Ekstrom, M., Schulsinger, F., Sorensen, H. & Mednick, S. 
(2004b). Childhood videotaped social and neuromotor precurors of schizophrenia: a 
prospective investigation. American Journal o f  psychiatry, 161, 2021-2027.
Scholl, B.J. & Leslie, A. (1999). Modularity, development and ‘theory o f mind.’ Mind 
and Language, 14, 131-153.
Sellen, J.L, Oaksford, M. & Gray, N.S. (2005). Schizotypy and conditional reasoning. 
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 31, 105-116.
Semple, D.M., McIntosh, A.M. & Lawrie, S.M. (2005). Cannabis as a risk factor for 
psychosis: systematic review. Journal o f  Psychopharmacology, 19, 187-194.
Shaw, K., McFarlane, A.C., Bookless, C. & Air, T. (2002). The aetiology of post- 
psychotic posttraumatic stress disorder following a psychotic episode. Journal o f  
Traumatic Stress, 15, 39-47.
Stone, V.E., Baron-Cohen, S., Calder, A., Keane, J. & Young, A. (2003). Acquired 
theory of mind impairments in individuals with bilateral amygdala lesions. 
Neuropsychologia, 41, 209-220.
Stuss, D.T., Gallup, G.G. Jr., & Alexander, M.P. (2001). The frontal lobes are necessary 
for ‘theory of mind.’ Brain, 124, 270-286.
van Os, J., Krabbendam, L., Myin-Germeys, I. & Delespaul, P. (2005). The 
schizophrenia envirome. Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 18, 141-145.
59
Ventura, J., Nuechterlein, K.H., Lukoff, D. & Hardesty, J.P. (1989). A prospective 
study of stressful life events and schizophrenic relapse. Journal o f  Abnormal 
Psychology, 98, 407-411.
Walker, E., Kestler, L., Bollini, A. & Hochman, K.M. (2004). Schizophrenia: Etiology 
and Course. Annual Review o f  Psychology, 55, 401-430.
Warner, R. (2005). Problems with early and very early intervention in psychosis. 
British Journal o f  Psychiatry, 187 (suppl. 48), sl04-sl07.
Whitfield, C., Dube, S., Felitti, V., Anda, R. (2005). Adverse childhood experiences and 
hallucinations. Child Abuse and Neglect, 29, 797-810.
Wimmer, H. & Pemer, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining 
function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 
13, 103-128.
Wing, J.K. & Gould, J. (1979). Severe impairments of social interaction and associated 
abnormalities in children: epidemiology and classification. Journal o f  autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 9, 11-79.
Wykes, T., Hamid, S. & Wagstaff, K. (2001). Theory of mind and executive functions 
in the non-psychotic siblings o f patients with schizophrenia. [Abstract]. Schizophrenia 
Research, 49 (suppl 1), 148.
Young, E. & Mason, O. (2006). Is there really a theory o f  mind deficit in psychosis 
proneness? Manuscript submitted for publication.
60
Young, E. & Mason, O. (in press). Psychosis-proneness and socially relevant reasoning. 
Psychiatry Research.
Yung, A.R., Phillips, L.J., Yuen, H.P., McGorry, P.D. (2004). Risk factors for psychosis 




Theory of Mind and its Relation to
Schizotypy
62
THEORY OF MIND AND ITS RELATION TO SCHIZOTYPY
ABSTRACT
There is good evidence to support F rith’s (1992) model o f  impaired theory o f  mind 
(ToM) in those diagnosed with schizophrenia. However, it is unclear whether abnormal 
ToM constitutes a symptom o f  the psychotic state or a trait characteristic evident before 
illness manifests. This study was designed to replicate and extend previous findings o f  
an association between ToM and psychosis-proneness. Sixty-two healthy volunteers 
completed a schizotypy questionnaire (the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory o f  Feelings and 
Experiences; O-LIFE), two ToM tasks (one verbal, one non-verbal), a measure o f  
executive function, a test to estimate verbal and non-verbal IQ, and additional measures 
fo r  which results are reported by Williams (unpublished thesis). No evidence was found  
fo r  impaired ToM accuracy in high vs. low schizotypes on either ToM task. However, in 
the non-verbal task, high schizotypes performed less accurately than low schizotypes in 
a random condition (p=0.007); they were more likely to ‘read meaning in randomness’ 
(p=0.002) and to attribute agency to randomly moving shapes (p=0.046). There was 
also a trend towards high schizotypes attributing more mental states in the non-verbal 
physical condition (p=0.077). In the non-verbal task, ‘reading meaning in randomness’, 
attributing agency in the random condition and imputing mental states in the physical 
condition were associated with the ‘Unusual Experiences’ (UE) dimension o f  schizotypy 
(p=0.004, p=0.046, p=0.040 respectively). This study therefore provides evidence fo r  a 
tendency to ‘over-mentalize ’ associated with positive schizotypy in particular.
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‘Theory o f mind’ refers to the ability to represent the mental states (thoughts, intentions 
and beliefs) of others and to use these representations to predict and understand 
behaviours (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Frith, Morton and Leslie (1991) term this 
ability as ‘mentalizing’.
Frith’s (1992) Cognitive Model of Schizophrenia
Frith (1992) proposed that a range of symptoms characteristic of schizophrenia could be 
explained in terms of impaired ToM. In Frith’s (1992) account, compromised ability to 
represent one’s own goals underpins disorders of ‘willed action’ (e.g. negative and 
disorganized symptoms of schizophrenia), impaired ability to represent one’s own 
intentions results in disorders o f self-monitoring (e.g. delusions of control and voice- 
commenting hallucinations and thought insertion) and inability to represent the 
intentions of others leads to symptoms such as delusions of reference, paranoid 
delusions and third person hallucinations. This account predicts that patients with 
schizophrenia showing ‘behavioural signs’ will be most impaired on tests of ToM, while 
those with only paranoid symptoms will perform better but will still be impaired relative 
to controls (Pickup & Frith, 2001).
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Research into Theory of M ind and Schizophrenia
Recent reviews of the literature conclude that there is good empirical evidence that ToM 
is impaired in people with schizophrenia relative to healthy controls (Brtine, 2005; 
Harrington, Siegert & McClure, 2005). However, a number o f more specific questions 
remain unanswered.
There is inconsistency across studies employing different ToM paradigms regarding 
which particular symptoms or symptom clusters are associated with mentalizing 
impairment. Studies addressing this question have employed a wide range of ToM 
measures and there has been little systematic investigation o f relationships between 
them. The nature of the ToM deficit is also unclear. Most tasks assess only the presence 
or absence of ToM abilities and do not facilitate identification of other differences in 
mentalizing. It may be that some symptoms of schizophrenia at least are associated with 
a tendency to ‘over-mentalize’ (i.e. to infer mental states when none are obviously 
suggested; Abu-Akel, 1999; Abu-Akel & Bailey, 2000; Blakemore, Sarfati, Bazin & 
Decety, 2003; Frith, 2004) and there is a need to further investigate this possibility. 
Another area of controversy relates to whether mentalizing impairment is symptomatic 




There is some indication from longitudinal and cross-sectional relative studies that an 
abnormality in social functioning generally, and mentalizing specifically, may be 
evident as a trait characteristic in those vulnerable to developing schizophrenia (Done, 
Crow, Johnstone & Sacker, 1994; Schiffman et ah, 2004; Wykes, Hamid & Wagstaff, 
2001; Janssen, Krabbendam, Jolles & van Os, 2003; Docherty, Rhinewine, Labhart & 
Gordinier, 1998). However, not all studies have found supportive evidence (Kelemen, 
Keri, Must, Benedek & Janka, 2004).
An alternative approach to investigating vulnerability to psychosis draws on continuity 
models of psychosis proneness and the concept of ‘schizotypy’. This approach has been 
used by previous researchers to evaluate Frith’s (1992) model, avoiding the possible 
confounding effects of factors associated with psychiatric illness (e.g. deficits in 
motivation or attention, anti-psychotic medication) on ToM performance.
The Schizotypy Paradigm
Schizotypy refers to personality traits in the normal population that are described by 
psychosis-related behaviours and experiences and of which the clinical symptoms of 
psychosis are viewed as extreme expressions. Such traits are argued to predispose a 
person towards psychotic breakdown when adverse physical, social, or environmental
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triggers are encountered. ‘Fully-dimensionaF models of vulnerability to psychosis argue 
for continuity in these traits throughout the population.
Support for the fully-dimensional approach comes from evidence for psychotic-like 
experiences widely present in the normal population (Johns et al., 2004) and from 
studies employing questionnaire measures derived from the approach (e.g. Oxford 
Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE: Mason, Claridge & Jackson,
1995); Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ: Raine, 1991)). The distribution, 
factor structure, heritability and predictive power o f scores on these scales (Chapman, 
Chapman, Kwapil, Eckblad & Zinser, 1994; Claridge et al., 1996; Claridge & Hewitt, 
1987; Johns & van Os, 2001; Kendler et al., 1991; Kendler & Hewitt, 1992) provide 
supportive evidence for schizophrenia-like traits in the normal population predisposing 
individuals towards psychotic breakdown when stressors are encountered (see Claridge, 
1994 for review).
Studies of Theory of Mind and Schizotypy
Experimental studies looking at the relationship between ToM task performance and 
schizotypy have produced mixed findings. A series o f experiments by Langdon and 
Coltheart found associations between high schizotypy scores and poorer performance on 
ToM conditions of a picture-sequencing task (Langdon & Coltheart, 1999) and on a 
perspective-taking task (Langdon & Coltheart, 2001). The former study comprised two 
experiments with inconsistent findings with respect to which schizotypal traits were
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associated with poorer ToM performance. Traits analogous to negative symptoms of 
schizophrenia were associated with poorer performance in one experiment and those 
analogous to positive symptoms were associated with poorer performance in the other. 
Langdon and Coltheart (2001) found a non-significant tendency towards an association 
between poorer ability to judge the appearance of an array from an alternative viewing 
perspective and high scores on sub-scales measuring cognitive-perceptual and 
disorganised schizotypal traits.
There is also evidence for differences in language usage and understanding associated 
with total schizotypy scores (Docherty et al., 1998; Langdon & Coltheart, 2004). 
Docherty et al.’s (1998) study found that, amongst the healthy parents o f children with 
schizophrenia, those scoring highly on the Schedule of Schizotypal Personalities (Baron, 
Asnis & Gruen, 1981) showed significantly poorer use of referential terms in their 
expressive language than did low scorers, perhaps indicating less accurate representation 
of the mental states of interlocutors amongst high schizotypes. In Langdon and 
Coltheart’s (2004) study, high-schizotypal adults were impaired relative to low 
schizotypal adults at identifying appropriate ironical speech acts. As consideration of 
the mental representations of the speaker is required to understand why an ironical 
statement, which obviously contradicts the conversational context, might be appropriate, 
these findings can be taken to support an association between schizotypy and 
abnormalities in mentalizing.
In contrast to the above findings, three studies have found no evidence for an association 
between total schizotypy score and poorer performance on mentalizing tasks (Lippett,
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2004; Pickup, 2006; Young & Mason, 2006). Young and Mason (2006) found no 
difference in the performance of those high or low in either total schizotypy or in any of 
its dimensions on any of three mentalizing tasks: the 4Picture-Sequencing Task’ used by 
Langdon and Coltheart (1999), the ‘Faux Pas Task’ (Gregory et al., 2002) and the ‘Eyes 
Test’ (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001). The sample size in this 
study was larger than that in Langdon and Coltheart’s (1999, 2001) experiments making 
it unlikely that null findings were due to a lack of power alone.
In Pickup’s (2006) study, mentalizing ability was measured using Fletcher et al.’s (1995) 
‘Stories Task’, which requires participants to answer questions about two categories of 
stories: those requiring consideration of mental states for events to be understood and 
those requiring consideration of physical causality for events to be understood. 
Although scores on the ToM condition of this task were not associated with mentalizing 
ability, they were predicted more specifically by schizotypal traits associated with the 
positive symptoms of schizophrenia. Pickup suggests that the effect size in his study 
may have been greater had the stories been read aloud to participants so that scenarios 
had to be processed ‘on-line’. This would constitute a more sensitive test of ToM than 
the paradigm he used, which permitted participants to take as much time as they needed 
to read and understand the stories, and may have allowed for an association between 
overall schizotypy score and ToM performance to be detected.
Lippett (2004) employed the ‘Triangles Task’ (Abell, Happe & Frith, 2000) in which 
participants are asked to describe what is happening in animations in which geometric 
shapes move in formations designed to elicit particular attributions (either of actions or
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of interactions or of mental states). The performance of high and low schizotypes was 
comparable in the ‘ToM’ and ‘goal-directed’ conditions, where the movement o f the 
shapes was designed to elicit mental state and interaction explanations respectively. 
However, in the ‘random’ condition, high schizotypes were significantly less accurate 
than low schizotypes. Poorer performance on this condition was associated with high 
scores on the Cognitive Perceptual factor of the SPQ (which corresponds to the positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia) and Lippett (2004) reports that the responses of high 
schizotypes tended to refer to some kind of purposeful interaction, and were suggestive 
of a “tendency to impute social meaning when there is none”.
This interesting finding (that high schizotypes, and particularly those scoring highly on 
traits analogous to positive symptoms of schizophrenia, tend to infer mental states more 
readily than do low schizotypes) requires further investigation. It relates to the 
suggestion of Abu-Akel (1999) that the positive symptoms of schizophrenia may be 
associated with a tendency to ‘hyper-mentalize’ (to over-attribute mental states). In 
contrast to Pickup (2006), Lippett (2004) did not control for either executive function, 
which has been shown to vary with schizotypy (e.g. Raine, Sheard, Reynolds & Lencz, 
1992) or general intellectual ability (IQ).
Taken together the literature pertaining to the relationship between ToM and schizotypy 
indicates that abnormalities in mentalizing can be detected in high as compared to low 
schizotypes; however, these differences are not apparent on all tasks. In parallel to the 
evidence from the schizophrenia literature, there is inconsistency in findings regarding 
relationships between particular symptom-related traits and mentalizing abilities. Again,
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a range of ToM measures have been employed with little systematic comparison 
between them. The majority of these tasks focus on identifying the presence or absence 
of mentalizing abilities and may thus be too crude to fully explore the nature of the 
differences in how mental states are attributed and understood. Lippett’s (2004) study is 
evidence that a deficit approach may be too simplistic.
There is clearly a need for further studies investigating the possibility of an abnormality 
in mentalizing style associated with vulnerability to psychosis. These studies should 
include multiple measures of ToM, with formats as ecologically valid as possible, and 
designed to tap a range of mentalizing skills, both verbal and non-verbal. They must 
also allow for aspects of difference in mentalizing style beyond a simple deficit to be 
identified, in particular the tendency to over-mentalize. According to Frith (2004) over- 
mentalizing can be clearly demonstrated only by showing that particular individuals 
attribute mental states in situations agreed by others to constitute purely mechanical 
occurrences.
Aims and Hypotheses
The current study aimed to explore differences in mentalizing associated with 
schizotypy using two tasks, one non-verbal and one verbal, in a between groups design. 
The Triangles Task employed by Lippett (2004) and the Stories Task used in Pickup’s 
(2006) study constituted non-verbal and verbal measures respectively. The Stories Task 
was extended to include a ‘random stories’ condition, to parallel the random condition in
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the Triangles Task. In line with Pickup’s (2006) suggestions, stories were read aloud to 
participants, rather than being presented visually, in order to obtain a more on-line, and 
hence more ecologically valid and perhaps more sensitive, measure o f ToM. As an 
extension to Lippett’s (2004) study, IQ and executive function were controlled for.
In accordance with Frith’s (1992) theoretical predictions, high schizotypes were 
expected to perform significantly less accurately than low schizotypes in the ToM 
condition of both the non-verbal (triangles) and the verbal (stories) task.
In line with Lippett’s (2004) findings, the high schizotypy group were also expected to 
perform less accurately than the low schizotypy group in the random condition of each 
task. They were predicted to show a greater tendency to ‘read meaning in randomness’ 
and, in line with Abu-Akel’s (1999) and Frith’s (2004) ideas, to ‘over-mentalize’, and 
give more ‘social cognition’ responses in the random conditions of both tasks and in the 
physical/goal-directed conditions, which can be fully described in mechanical terms. 
The tendency to read meaning in randomness and impute social cognition in physical 
and random conditions was expected to be particularly associated with the UE 
dimension of schizotypy, which relates to the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. This 
would be consistent with Abu-Akel’s (1999) suggestion that these symptoms are 
associated with ‘hyper-mentalizing’ in patients with schizophrenia, Frith’s (2004) 
proposal that paranoid symptoms may be associated with over-mentalizing and Lippett’s 
(2004) finding of an association between scores on the Cognitive Perceptual factor of the 
SPQ and less accurate performance on the random condition of the Triangles Task.
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This study also allowed for some investigation of the extent to which different ToM 
paradigms tap the same underlying construct. In line with the general assumption that 
this is the case, it was predicted that ToM accuracy scores on the Stories and Triangles 
Tasks would be significantly associated with each other. It was also predicted that 
accuracy scores in the random conditions of the two task would be correlated, and that 
the tendencies to read meaning in randomness and to impute social cognition in random 




Participants were recruited through posters displayed around University College London 
and by word of mouth through associates o f the researcher. General inclusion criteria 
included age between 18 and 50 years, English as a first language and no history of 
serious mental illness or head injury. In order to ensure that a broad range of schizotypy 
was represented within the participant group, the sampling method employed by Pickup 
(2006) was utilised. This involved using the Schizotypal Personality Scale (STA) of the 
Claridge and Broks (1984) Schizotypy Questionnaire (STQ), as a screen to select 
participants. Incorporated into this questionnaire was the 12 item ‘Lie’ scale from the 
Short Form of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire -  Revised (EPQ-R; Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1991). These items assess the respondent’s tendency to answer untruthfully in
73
a socially desirable way. Those scoring more than one standard deviation above the 
population mean for their age-group and sex on the Tie scale’ (Eysenck & Eysenck,
1996) were excluded from further participation on the rationale that their responses to 
other questionnaire items were unreliable. Three respondents were excluded from the 
study on the basis of their scores on this social desirability index. Respondents were 
then selected on the basis of their STA scores in an attempt to recruit roughly equal 
numbers of ‘high’, Tow’ and ‘medium’ schizotypes. Medium schizotypes were those 
scoring within one standard deviation of the population mean quoted by Claridge and 
Broks (1984) while high schizotypes scored at least one standard deviation above this 
mean and low schizotypes scored at least one standard deviation below this mean.
Previous research has demonstrated that significant group differences in ToM between 
high and low schizotypes can be detected with a total sample of 36 participants 
(Langdon & Coltheart, 2004) and group differences in the tendency to over-mentalize 
can be obtained with a sample of 40 (Lippett, 2004). The final sample in this study 




Ethical approval to undertake this study was obtained from the University College 
London ethics committee on non-NHS human research. All participants were assured 
that any information they gave would remain confidential and all provided written, 
informed consent. Following the experiment, participants were given the opportunity to 
discuss the procedure and whether they had found any aspect of it distressing. In the 
event, no participants reported any distress. Copies of the information sheet provided to 
participants, the consent form they each signed and the letter granting the study ethical 
approval are shown in Appendices 1 and 2.
Procedure
Participants were administered the measures described below in the order listed 
(although the order in which the two questionnaires were completed was not specified). 
Testing took place on one occasion, in a quiet room, and the session lasted for 
approximately an hour and a quarter. Participants received £10 as reimbursement for 
their time and travel. Copies o f the questionnaires and the Stories Task, and examples of 
scoring criteria for experimental measures are given in Appendix 3. Data collection was 
carried out by myself and one other researcher, who was collecting data for the purpose 
of a study comparing the performance of high and low schizotypes on a further 
computer animation task. Decisions regarding the design of the study were made jointly 
by my co-researcher and myself.
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M easures
1. The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE)
The O-LIFE is a self-report measure of schizotypy devised by Mason, Claridge and 
Jackson (1995). It is based on the four schizotypy factors found by Claridge et al. 
(1996) and reflecting this, its four scales are labelled ‘Unusual Experiences’ (UE), 
‘Cognitive Disorganisation’ (CD), ‘Impulsive Non-conformity’ (IN) and ‘Introvertive 
Anhedonia’ (IA). The questionnaire comprises 24 to 30 questions on each of these 
scales. The items are based on an extensive study of ‘schizotypal’ traits, which involved 
factor analysis of fifteen psychosis-proneness scales in over 1000 subjects (Claridge et 
al., 1996). The scale was constructed with a focus on trait rather than symptom features 
of psychosis and is in this way argued to be well suited to addressing issues such as risk 
for psychosis in non-clinical populations (Mason & Claridge, 2006). Mason et al. 
(1995) report high internal consistency for each of the scales (for UE a = 0.89; for CD a 
= 0.87; for IA a = 0.82; and for IN a = 0.77.) These results have since been confirmed 
by Rawlings and Freeman (1997: 0.77, 0.81, 0.85 and 0.72). Test-retest reliability has 
also been found to be high (>0.70) for all four scales (Burch, Steel & Hemsley, 1988) 
and Mason and Claridge (2006) quote studies across many research domains in which 
the construct validity o f the scale as a measure of schizotypal traits has been clearly 
established.
Questionnaires were scored and raw scores standardised using Mason and Claridge’s 
(2006) population norms, derived from a sample o f 1926 participants. This was
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necessary because schizotypy is known to vary with sex and age (e.g. Claridge & 
Hewitt, 1987).
2. The Stories Task
The Stories Task used in Pickup’s study comprises 16 passages developed by Fletcher et 
al. (1995) for use with normal adults. There are eight ‘ToM’ and eight ‘physical’ stories 
and each is followed by a question. The ToM stories were originally designed by Happe
(1994) to test ToM in high-functioning autistic children. They describe scenarios 
including double bluff, white lie and persuasion. Participants must infer the mental state 
of a story character in order to answer the question correctly. Happe (1994) found these 
stories to discriminate between autistic participants who passed standard false-belief 
tasks and non-autistic controls. The physical stories were designed by Fletcher et al.
(1995) as a control for ToM stories for use in a functional imaging study of ToM; they 
were matched for difficulty to ToM stories in a non-clinical adult sample. As in the 
ToM condition, the stories involve people, and participants are required to integrate 
story information to infer an answer. However, in order to answer physical story 
questions correctly, no consideration of mental states is required. Rather an inference 
must be made about physical causation (e.g. to give a reason for taking an x-ray after a 
fall). Fletcher et al.’s stories have been used to identify superior ToM abilities in elderly 
individuals, and ToM impairments in those who have experienced a right hemisphere 
stroke (Happe, Brownell & Winner, 1999; Happe, Winner & Brownell, 1998).
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An additional eight ‘random stories’ were developed for the purpose of this study. 
These were matched in length to the original stories; they were based around comparable 
themes and involved the same numbers of story characters. The passages describe a 
series of unrelated events and are followed by a question, for which no obvious answer 
can be inferred from the story. The random stories were piloted with six associates of 
the researcher. In this pilot trial, respondents gave a range of responses to each item.
In line with Pickup’s suggestions, stories were read out loud to participants once only so 
that ToM could be assessed ‘on-line’. All 24 passages and their accompanying 
questions were recorded onto audiotape, read by an associate o f the researcher at an even 
pace. Participants were played one practice story and question, followed by the test 
stories and questions. The ToM, physical and random passages were presented in a 
pseudo-random order. Participants’ responses were recorded onto audiotape for later 
transcription, and accuracy was scored using standard criteria (Fletcher et al., 1995). 
Responses were also categorised according to type (‘random’, ‘physical’ or 
‘mentalizing’). Scoring was carried out blind to the schizotypy score of the participant 
and a second rater, who was blind to the study hypotheses, scored a sub-set of 20 data 
sets. Agreement between raters was good for both accuracy (83%) and description type 
(90%).
3. The Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTARUK)
The WTARuk (Wechsler, 2001) is a well-established test, which can be used to provide 
an estimate of verbal intelligence (VIQ) and performance intelligence (PIQ). It was
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thought important to control for both VIQ and PIQ in the current study as the measures 
of ToM employed tap both verbal and non-verbal skills. The WTARUK requires 
participants to read a list of 50 words that have atypical grapheme to phoneme 
translations. The test has been co-normed with the WAIS-IIIUK test of general 
intelligence, enabling effective prediction of full-scale IQ and its components, taking 
account of age and demographic data. VIQ and PIQ were calculated from the Wechsler 
(2001) normative data and conversion tables. Scores derived from these data have been 
shown to correlate well with WAIS-IIIUK measures of VIQ and PIQ (Wechsler, 2001: 
r=0.70 and r=0.53 respectively for the UK sample). The WTAR has been demonstrated 
to have good internal consistency, with coefficients ranging from 0.87-9.95 for different 
age groups in a UK sample. Test-retest reliability for different age groups has been 
shown to range from 0.90 to 0.94.
4. The Triangles Task
This task was originally developed by Castelli, Happe, Frith & Frith (2000) in an 
attempt to design a measure that selectively evoked mental state attributions without 
taxing other capacities such as executive functions and inhibitory control, and that 
tapped more on-line, ecologically valid ToM skills than standard false-belief tasks 
(perhaps the best established measure of ToM). It has been shown to be sensitive to 
ToM impairment amongst high-functioning children with autism, differentiating even 
those autistic children who pass false-belief tasks from non-clinical controls and those 
with general intellectual impairment (Abell et al., 2000).
79
The task comprises twelve, short, computer-presented animations showing one large, red 
and one small, blue triangle moving around the screen. There are three conditions: 
‘random’, ‘goal-directed’ and ‘ToM’. In the random animations, the triangles do not 
interact with each other and move about purposelessly. The goal-directed animations 
involve one triangle responding to the other’s behaviour, there is no implication that 
either triangle is reading the other’s ‘mind’ and the animations are likely to evoke direct 
descriptions of interaction (e.g. fighting or dancing). The ‘ToM ’ sequences, by contrast, 
show one triangle reacting to the other’s mental state (e.g. trying to persuade the other to 
let it free) and are designed to provoke explanations which refer to these mental states. 
For the purpose of this study, the ‘goal-directed’ condition will be referred to as the 
‘physical’ condition.
Participants were first shown two practice items, one physical and one ToM, followed 
by the test animations, presented in a pseudo-random order. After each presentation, 
participants were asked to describe what they perceived to be happening in the 
animation.
Responses were recorded onto audiotape, transcribed, and scored according to the 
standard criteria (Abell et al., 2000). Descriptions were also categorised according to 
type (‘random’, ‘interaction/goal-directed’ or ‘mentalizing’). Scoring was carried out 
blind to the schizotypy score o f the participant. A second rater, who was blind to the 
study hypotheses, scored a sub-set o f data sets. Agreement between raters was again 
good for both accuracy (85%) and response type (90%).
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5. The Hayling Test
This task, developed by Burgess and Shallice (1997), is a short sentence completion test 
measuring ability to generate and inhibit responses. The nature of responses on both the 
Triangles Task and the Stories Task might be expected to be affected by these aspects of 
executive function and the task was included in the study to enable their influence to be 
controlled for. The test is in two parts. In the first (‘sensible completion’) task 
participants are asked to provide a word to complete each of 15 sentences, which are 
read aloud by the tester. The second (‘unconnected completion’) task requires 
participants to give a word that does not fit at the end o f each of 15 sentences. 
Participants are asked to respond as quickly as possible and response times are recorded. 
Raw scores for total response time on each subtest and total number of errors in the test 
as a whole (unconnected responses in the sensible completion task or connected 
sentence completions in the unconnected task) were recorded and converted to scaled 
scores using Burgess and Shallice’s (1997) normative data. The scaled score for the task 
as a whole (a composite of standard scores for time taken on sensible completion and 
unconnected completion tasks and for errors on the latter task) was used in analyses as 
an overall measure of executive function. The test-retest reliability of this measure has 
been shown to be good (>0.70), and those with frontal lobe injuries (which are 
associated with impairment in executive function) obtain significantly lower overall 
scaled scores than those with posterior lesions (Burgess & Shallice, 1997).
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Data Analyses
Participants were sub-grouped into high and low schizotypes using a median split of the 
O-LIFE total standard score. Scores on the Triangles and Stories Tasks could then be 
analysed in an independent group design. Regressions were also carried out using the 
whole sample to explore associations between scores on experimental measures and on 
O-LIFE sub-scales. Data was analysed using the computer package SPSS version 11.5. 




Of the 62 participants 29 (46.8%) were male and 33 (53.2%) were female. Participants’ 
ages ranged from 18-42 years, with a mean age of 24.23 and a standard deviation of 
4.62.
Questionnaire Measures
Scores on the STA ranged from 0 to 36 with a mean (standard deviation) of 17.6 (9.57). 
Scores on the ‘Lie Scale’ items ranged from 0 to 5 with a mean (standard deviation) of 
1.85 (1.54).
The mean and standard deviation of scores on the O-LIFE sub-scales are shown in Table
1. These compare well with the normative data for the scales, shown in Table 2, 
particularly in the 21-30 age group for which the current sample is largest. As would be 
predicted given the sampling method employed, the standard deviations of sub-scale 
scores in the current sample are slightly larger than those in the general population. 
When the sample as a whole is looked at, mean scores on three of the four sub-scales are 
slightly higher than those in Mason and Claridge’s (2006) norms. This is likely to be 
due to the younger age range in the current sample. Mason and Claridge’s (2006) norms 
indicate that scores on these three scales decrease with age, while those on the
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'Introvertive Anhedonia' scale (on which the current sample scored slightly higher than 
the population norms) increase with age. A wide range o f scores was represented on 
each sub-scale. Analysis of the skewness and kurtosis of O-LIFE sub-scale standard 
scores found all but IA (which was negatively skewed) to meet conditions for normality 
to be assumed. Total O-LIFE scores (calculated by summing sub-scale standard scores) 
were not significantly skewed or kurtotic.
Median Split Analysis
Participants were sub-grouped into 31 low schizotypal and 31 high schizotypal subjects 
using a median split of the O-LIFE total standard score (median=1.02). There were 14 
males and 17 females in the low schizotypy group and 15 males and 16 females in the 
high schizotypy group. A Chi-squared test showed no significant group difference in 
gender, x2 0> N=62)=0.065, p=0.80. The mean (standard deviation) age was 24.13 
(3.49) in the low schizotypy group and 24.32 (5.58) in the high schizotypy group. There 
was no significant group difference in age, t (60)=-0.16, p=0.87.
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Table 1: Mean (standard deviation) scores on O-Life sub-scales
Age under 22 Age 21-30 Age 31-40 Age 41-50 Total sample




UE 17.33 (8.87) 14.09 (7.85) 9.28 (8.25) 9.47 (7.51) 5.50 (0.71) 16.50 (3.54) 17.00 (0) 11.19 (8.16) 0-29
CD 16.67 (6.12) 13.18 (8.08) 12.84 (6.84) 11.80 (6.58) 13.00 (4.24) 16.50 (3.54) 17.00 (0) 13.23 (6.74) 0-24
IA 9.83 (8.47) 6.18 (4.40) 4.32 (3.88) 5.53 (4.97) 10.00 (9.90) 6.00 (1.41) 10.00 (0) 5.81 (5.07) 0-20
IN 12.50 (3.02) 10.91 (5.65) 9.40 (3.83) 11.07 (2.60) 8.00 (1.41) 13.00 (1.41) 9.00 (0) 10.44 (3.85) 1-18
Table 2: Normative data for O-Life sub-scales (Mean [standard deviation!; Mason & Claridge, 2006)
Age under 22 Age 21-30 Age 31-40 Age 41-50 Total sample
Female Male Female Male Female Male Male Age 17-85
(n=237) (n=159) (n=250) (n=152) (n=233) (n=53) (n=65) (n=1926)
O-LIFE sub-scale
UE 10.21 (6.40) 10.08 (6.16) 9.72 (6.55) 9.83 (6.36) 8.67 (6.22) 8.11 (5.94) 7.72 (5.88) 8.82 (6.16)
CD 12.68 (5.71) 11.96 (5.66) 11.74 (5.70) 11.05 (5.73) 10.55 (5.56) 9.68 (6.73) 9.66 (6.16) 10.73 (5.87)
IA 5.03 (4.02) 6.06 (3.97) 5.15 (3.85) 6.26 (4.97) 5.96 (4.00) 6.68 (5.25) 7.48 (4.73) 6.38 (4.49)
IN 9.27 (3.90) 9.80 (4.41) 8.86 (3.86) 10.26 (3.84) 7.62 (3.86) 8.48 (3.91) 7.94 (4.11) 7.69 (4.12)
oo
Control Tasks
Descriptive statistics for the verbal IQ, performance IQ and Hayling total scaled score 
for low and high schizotypy groups and for the sample as a whole are shown in Table 3 
below.
Table 3: Means (standard deviations) of verbal IQ, performance IQ and Hayling scaled 
scores of high and low schizotypes
Low schizotypes High schizotypes Total sample
Hayling 6.58 (1.09) 6.29 (1.10) 6.44 (1.10)
WTAR: VIQ 110.81 (5.20) 108.94 (4.75) 109.87 (5.03)
WTAR: PIQ 111.39 (4.62) 109.71 (4.23) 110.55 (4.47)
The skewness and kurtosis of all these variables permitted approximation to normality. 
There were no significant differences between groups in verbal IQ, t (59)=1.53, p==0.13; 
performance IQ, t (59)= 1.54, p=0.13; or executive function score, t (60)= 1.04, 0.30. 
Although executive function (as measured by Hayling overall standard score) correlated 
significantly with total O-LIFE score and with O-LIFE CD standard score (see 
Appendix 4), none of the correlations between control variables (verbal IQ, performance 
IQ or executive function) and experimental variables were significant (see Appendix 5). 
Control measures were not therefore included in further analyses.
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Experim ental M easures
Analysis was carried out on both the accuracy and the type o f responses given by high 
and low schizotypes in the various conditions o f the Stories and Triangles Tasks. 
Descriptive statistics for these scores are shown in Tables 4 and 5. Correlations between 
experimental variables are shown in Appendix 6.
1. Accuracy Scores
Accuracy scores in the random conditions of the two tasks are not directly comparable to 
accuracy scores in the physical and ToM conditions. In the latter two conditions 
accuracy scores are measures of participants’ ability to give correct meaningful 
interpretations of stimuli in response to a question. In the random conditions, by 
contrast, the stimuli are designed to provide no specific meaningful response to the 
question and accuracy scores reflect the extent to which participants infer meaning in the 
stimuli, with lower scores representing a greater tendency to see the items as non- 
random. Therefore, the physical condition in each task constitutes a control for the 
corresponding ToM condition but not for the random condition. For this reason, 
accuracy scores in the ToM and physical conditions o f each task were compared in an 
analysis of variance while accuracy scores in the random conditions were analysed 
separately.
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Table 4: Means (standard deviations) of accuracy and response type scores o f high and 





ToM condition + 13.81 (1.68) 13.07 (1.55) 13.44(1.65)
Physical condition + 11.94 (2.31) 11.43 (2.91) 11.69 (2.61)
Random condition 6.06 (3.45) 5.94 (2.87) 6.00 (3.15)
Response type:
Reading meaning in 
randomness* 13.66 (7.45) 13.77 (6.77) 13.42 (7.05)
Mental state attributions in 
random condition 3.00(1.79) 3.06(1.57) 3.03 (1.67)
Mental state attributions in 
physical condition 1.58 (1.48) 1.77 (2.03) 1.68 (1.76)
+ One outlier removed
Table 5: Means (standard deviations) of accuracy and response type scores of high and





ToM condition 5.55 (1.52) 5.42 (1.43) 5.48 (1.46)
Physical condition 6.90 (0.87) 6.58 (1.20) 6.74(1.05)
Random condition 6.74 (2.16) 5.77 (1.93) 6.26 (2.09)
N ature of response:
Reading meaning in 
randomness+ 2.35 (3.79) 5.50 (4.80) 3.90 (4.57)
Agency attribution in random 
condition 1.03 (1.52) 1.55 (1.23) 1.29(1.40)
Mental states attribution in 
physical condition 0.26 (0.77) 0.58 (0.99) 0.42 (0.90)
+ One outlier removed
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Stories Task: ToM and physical conditions
There was one outlying accuracy score (standard score more than three standard 
deviations from the mean) in the ToM condition of the Stories Task: a single high 
schizotype with a particularly low ToM accuracy score. This outlier was removed from 
the analysis. Subsequent analysis of the skewness and kurtosis statistics of each of the 
variables found them to meet conditions for normality to be assumed in both high and 
low schizotypy groups.
As can be seen from Table 4, there was little difference between the performance of the 
two groups on either the ToM or the physical condition, although both high and low 
schizotypes performed less accurately on the physical than on the ToM task. A two-way 
mixed ANOVA with two levels on the between subject factor of subject group (low and 
high schizotypy) and two levels on the within subject factor o f story type (ToM and 
physical) found the main effect of story type to be significant, F (1,59)=22.99, p<0.001, 
indicating that the sample as a whole scored lower in the physical than in the ToM 
condition. Contrary to predictions, there was no evidence that high schizotypes were 
specifically impaired on the ToM condition as the interaction between story type and 
group was non-significant, F (1,59)=0.11, p=0.75. The main effect of the between 
subjects factor (schizotypy group) was also non-significant, F (1,59)=2.17, p=0.13.
Stories Task: Random condition
There were no outliers in this condition and, based on analysis of skewness and kurtosis 
statistics, both high and low schizotypy groups met conditions for normality to be
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assumed. Again, contrary to hypotheses, there was no significant group difference in 
accuracy score in the random stories condition, t (60)=0.16, p=0.87.
Triangles Task: ToM and physical conditions
There were no outlying accuracy scores in the ToM or the physical condition of the 
Triangles Task and analysis of the skewness and kurtosis of the distributions of these 
scores revealed that conditions were met for normality to be assumed. The descriptive 
data (Table 5) indicates little difference between the accuracy scores of high and low 
schizotypes on either condition.
A two-way mixed ANOVA with two levels on the between subject factor of subject 
group (low versus high schizotypy) and two levels on the within subject factor of story 
type (ToM and physical) revealed a significant main effect of condition, F (1,60)=40.52, 
pO.OOl, suggesting that the sample as a whole performed less accurately in the ToM 
condition than in the physical condition. Contrary to predictions, there was no 
significant interaction between condition and group, F (1,60)=0.24, p=0.63, and hence 
no evidence that the high schizotypy group were specifically impaired, relative to the 
low schizotypy group, in the ToM condition. The main effect o f the between subjects 
factor (schizotypy group) was not significant, F (1,60)=0.76, p=0.39.
Triangles Task: Random condition
The low schizotypy group but not the high schizotypy group performed at ceiling in the 
random triangles condition. A non-parametric comparison revealed that, in line with 
predictions, there was a significant group difference between high and low schizotypy
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groups in accuracy scores on this condition, U=298.00 (z=-2.69), p=0.007, with greater 
scores in the low schizotypy group than in the high schizotypy group. The accuracy 
scores of high and low schizotypes in the random condition o f the Triangles Task are 
illustrated in Figure 1.
2. Response types 
i) Reading meaning in randomness
A “reading meaning in randomness” variable was created by summing the number of 
connections and elaborations given in responses to random condition items for each task.
Stories Task
There was one outlying reading meaning in randomness score in the Stories Task (a high 
schizotype with an unusually high score). After removing this outlier, analysis of 
skewness and kurtosis found the variable to meet conditions for normality to be 
assumed. A t-test was performed and no significant difference was found in reading 
meaning in randomness scores between high and low schizotypes, t (59)=-0.059, p=0.95.
A regression was performed to investigate whether reading meaning in randomness 
score in the Stories Task was predicted by any of the four dimensions of schizotypy 
derived from the O-LIFE questionnaire. The dependent variables were standardized 
scores on each of the four sub-scales of the O-LIFE (the IA variable was square root
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transformed to meet conditions for normality to be assumed) and the independent 
variable was reading meaning in randomness. One outlier was removed. All dependent 
variables were entered simultaneously. Overall this model did not significantly predict 
variance in reading meaning in randomness, F (4,56)=0.098, p=0.983. Adjusted R2=- 
0.064. As can be seen in Table 6 below, none of the dimensions of the O-LIFE 
independently predicted reading meaning in randomness on this task.
Table 6: Associations between O-LIFE sub-scale standard scores and reading meaning 
in randomness scores on the Stories Task
O-LIFE sub-scale Beta t P
Unusual Experiences 0.090 -0.464 0.645
Cognitive Disorganisation -0.047 -0.232 0.817
Introvertive Anhedonia -0.026 -0.153 0.879
Impulsive Non-conformity -0.079 -0.423 0.674
Triangles Task
After removing one outlier (a high schizotype who showed an unusually high tendency 
to make connections and elaborate) and transforming the variable using a square root 
transformation, analysis of skewness and kurtosis statistics indicated that the reading 
meaning in randomness variable met conditions for normality in both high and low 
schizotypy groups. A t-test comparing the means on the transformed variable found 
high schizotypes to be significantly more likely to read meaning into random items than 
low schizotypes, t (59)=-3.28, p=0.002. The reading meaning in randomness scores of 
high and low schizotypes in the Triangles Task are illustrated in Figure 2.
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A regression was performed to investigate whether any of the four dimensions of 
schizotypy (measured by the standardized score on the O-LIFE) independently predicted 
reading meaning in randomness (again the variable was square root transformed and one 
outlier was removed, such that it met conditions for normality to be assumed). All four
O-LIFE dimension scores were entered simultaneously (again with the IA variable 
square root transformed to meet conditions for normality). This model accounted for 
16.8% of the variance in reading meaning into randomness, F (4,56)=4.027, p=0.006. 
Adjusted R2=0.168. As can be seen in Table 7 below, only UE was a significant 
independent predictor of reading meaning in randomness in the Triangles Task.
Table 7: Associations between O-LIFE sub-scale standard scores and reading meaning 
in randomness scores on the Triangles Task
O-LIFE sub-scale Beta T P
Unusual Experiences 0.475 2.974 0.004**
Cognitive Disorganisation -0.019 -0.108 0.915
Introvertive Anhedonia 0.019 0.126 0.901
Impulsive Non-conformity 0.004 0.023 0.981
** Regression coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.
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ii) Im puting ‘social cognition’
In the Triangles Task responses were classified as ‘mentalizing’, ‘interaction/goal - 
directed’, or ‘random’ while in the Stories Task they were classified as ‘mentalizing’, 
‘physical’ or ‘random’. In line with the hypothesis that high schizotypes tend to impute 
mental states more readily than low schizotypes in conditions where no mental state is 
obviously implied, the level of mentalizing in responses of both groups to random and 
physical items was analysed. Correlations were also performed to investigate the extent 
to which mentalizing was associated with UE score in random and physical conditions 
of each task.
Stories Task: Random condition
In the Stories Task, there was no significant group difference in tendency to impute 
mental states in the random condition, t (60)=-1.51, p=0.88. A Pearson correlation 
revealed no significant association between UE standard score and tendency to impute 
mental states in the random stories condition, r=0.152, N=62, p=0.237.
Stories Task: Physical condition
The number of mental state responses in the physical condition of the Stories Task was 
negatively skewed in both high and low schizotypy groups. A square root 
transformation was performed after which analysis of skewness and kurtosis statistics 
indicated that the variable met conditions for normality to be assumed. A t-test found no 
significant difference between groups in the tendency to give mental state responses in 
physical conditions, t (60)=-0.12, p=0.90. There was no significant correlation between
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UE score and the number of mental state responses given in the physical condition, r=- 
0.061, N=62, p=0.64.
Triangles Task: Random condition
Very few participants (n=10) made mentalizing attributions in the random condition of 
the Triangles Task. However, interaction/goal-directed attributions entail an implicit 
consideration of social cognition and an attribution of agency to the object. For this 
reason ‘mentalizing’ and ‘interaction/goal-directed’ responses were combined into a 
single ‘agency’ variable.
‘Agency’ scores in the low schizotypy group but not the high schizotypy group were at 
floor. A non-parametric test was carried out. This revealed that high schizotypes were 
significantly more likely than the low schizotypes to impute agency to the randomly 
moving triangles, U=345.00, z=-2.00, p=0.046. Figure 3 illustrates the number of 
agency attributions made by high and low schizotypes in the random condition of the 
Triangles Task. Agency scores in the random condition were significantly correlated 
with UE scores, p=0.365, N=62, p=0.004.
Triangles Task: Physical condition
The number of mental state responses given in the physical condition was close to floor 
in both high and low schizotypy groups and the variable remained negatively skewed 
after a square root transformation was performed. A non-parametric test was therefore 
carried out. High schizotypes tended to give more mental state attribution responses 
when the animation depicted a purely physical interaction than did low schizotypes; this
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difference reached trend levels of significance, U=384.50, z=-1.77, p=0.077. Figure 4 
shows the number of mental state responses given by high and low schizotypes in the 
physical triangles condition. There was a significant correlation between UE scores and 
number of mental state responses given in the physical condition, p=0.261, N=62, 
p=0.04.
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Figures 1-4: Graphs to illustrate significant group differences
Figure 1: Accuracy scores o f high and low 
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Figure 2: Reading meaning in randomness 
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Figure 3: Agency responses o f high and 
low schizotypes in random condition o f 
Triangles Task
Figure 4: M ental state responses o f high 
and low schizotypes in physical condition 
o f Triangles Task
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3. Comparison of tasks
ToM conditions
A correlation was performed to investigate whether ToM scores on the Stories Task 
were associated with scores on the Triangles Task. Again the one participant with an 
outlying accuracy score in the ToM condition of the Stories Task was removed from the 
analysis. There was no significant relationship between ToM accuracy scores on the 
two tasks, r=-0.035, N=61, p=0.791.
Random conditions
There was no significant relationship between accuracy scores in the random condition 
in the two tasks, p=0.10, N=62, p=0.43.
Reading meaning in randomness
The one participant with an outlying reading meaning in randomness score on the 
Stories Task was removed, as was the one participant with an outlying reading meaning 
in randomness score on the Triangles Task. There was no significant association 
between these two variables, r=0.091, N=60, p=0.487.
Imputing social cognition
There was no significant association between the tendency to impute social cognition in 
the random condition of each task, p=0.067, N=62, p=0.604, or the physical condition of 
each task, p=0.047, N=62, p=0.716.
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DISCUSSION
In the light of inconclusive evidence regarding atypical mentalizing as a marker of risk 
for psychosis, the current study was designed to explore the relationship between ToM 
and schizotypy using both non-verbal and auditory-verbal paradigms. In line with 
Frith’s (1992) theory, it was predicted that high schizotypes would perform less 
accurately than low schizotypes on the ToM conditions of both tasks. Given the 
findings of Lippett (2004) it was also hypothesised that high schizotypes would perform 
less accurately in the ‘random’ condition of each task. It was expected that, in line with 
Lippett’s (2004) findings and the suggestions of Abu-Akel (1999) and Frith (2004), high 
schizotypes would impute social cognition more readily than low schizotypes where 
none was obviously indicated (i.e. in random and physical conditions of both tasks), and 
that this tendency would be associated with the UE dimension of schizotypy in 
particular. Finally, it was predicted that there would be an association between 
corresponding measures of mentalizing derived from each task.
Contrary to expectations, and to the predictions of Frith’s (1992) model, there was no 
difference between the accuracy of high and low schizotypes in the ToM condition of 
either task. These findings are inconsistent with those o f Langdon and Coltheart (1999, 
2001, 2004) and Docherty et al. (1998). However, they are consistent with those of 
Young and Mason (2006) who found no difference in the mentalizing abilities of high 
and low schizotypes on three different measures o f ToM. They replicate the findings of 
Lippett (2004) and Pickup (2006) who report no evidence for a difference between the
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performance of those with high and low overall schizotypy scores on the ToM condition 
of the Triangles Task and the Stories Task respectively.
In the current study, the mode of presentation used by Pickup (2006) was altered in 
order to obtain a more ecologically valid and perhaps more sensitive measure of ToM. 
Participants were required to listen to, rather than read, the stories and make more ‘on­
line’ judgements in response to questions. Pickup (2006) reasons that this mode of 
presentation should produce a larger effect size than that used in his study, which 
allowed participants as much time as they wanted to read each story before responding 
to a question; however, despite altering the mode of presentation, no effect was detected. 
As an extension of Lippett’s (2004) study, executive function, verbal IQ and 
performance IQ were controlled for. Consistent with the findings of Raine et al. (1992), 
executive function was found to be associated with schizotypy, however no relationship 
was detected between any of the control variables and measures o f performance on 
either ToM task.
In line with hypotheses, high schizotypes performed worse than low schizotypes on the 
random condition of the Triangles Task. They showed a greater tendency than low 
schizotypes to read meaning in the random movements o f the triangles and to attribute 
agency to the shapes. There was also a tendency for high schizotypes to attribute more 
mental states in the physical condition o f the Triangles Task where the movement of 
triangles could be described in purely mechanical terms, although this tendency did not 
reach significance. These findings replicate and extend those of Lippett (2004). In the 
triangles condition, reading meaning in randomness, attributing agency in the random
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condition, and attributing mental states in the physical condition were all associated with 
the UE dimension of schizotypy in particular. These findings relate to that o f Pickup 
(2006) in that those scoring highly on UE in particular show differences in mentalizing 
style. They are consistent with Lippett’s (2004) finding of an association between 
scores on the Cognitive Perceptual factor of the SPQ and less accurate performance on 
the random condition of the Triangles Task. They also correspond to Abu-Akel’s (1999) 
suggestion that the positive symptoms of schizophrenia are associated with a tendency to 
‘hyper-mentalize’, with Frith’s (2004) theory that paranoid delusions are underpinned by 
‘over-mentalizing’, and with Blakemore et al.’s (2003) finding that patients with 
delusions of persecution perceived contingency between the movement of shapes in 
conditions where non-clinical controls and psychiatric patients without persecutory 
delusions did not.
The method of participant selection used in this study (which was also that used by 
Pickup (2006)) may have favoured the finding o f a particular association between UE, 
over any of the other three dimensions, and unusual mentalizing. O f the O-LIFE sub­
scales, the STA questionnaire is most heavily weighted towards UE. Using this 
questionnaire as a screen and ensuring that a range o f STA scores was represented in the 
sample would be likely to lead to wider representation of UE scores than of scores on 
other dimensions, increasing the likelihood of a relationship being detected for UE as 
opposed to other sub-scales. However, although the range and standard deviation of 
scores on the UE scale was greatest, there was also a good range of scores on each of the 
other O-LIFE sub-scales within the sample making it likely that any association between 
abnormal mentalizing and other dimensions of schizotypy would have been detected.
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The finding of increased propensity to read meaning in randomness in the Triangles 
Task amongst high as compared to low schizotypes may relate to the well-established 
association between schizotypy and ‘creativity’ (e.g. Burch, Pavelis, Hemsley & Corr, 
2006; Eysenck & Fumham, 1993; Green & Williams, 1999). Several studies have 
demonstrated that high schizotypes provide a greater number of ‘original’ responses than 
do low schizotypes on measures of ‘divergent thinking’, which are argued to tap one 
aspect of creativity (e.g. Green & Williams, 1999). ‘Divergent thinking’ tasks require 
participants to, for example, think of as many possible different uses for a particular 
object, or name as many items in a particular category as they can. It is easy to see how 
the tendency to see possible meaningful explanations for random triangle movements 
might relate to an ability to generate more ideas.
It is possible that the finding of increased attribution of agency or ‘mental states’ to 
mechanical or random movements amongst high, as compared to low, schizotypes is 
purely an artefact of their greater tendency to read meaning in randomness. This would 
be the case if, for both high and low schizotypes, the most obvious ascription of meaning 
to a random scenario involved attribution of mental states. The skewed nature of the 
data in this study prevented further exploration o f this possibility; it would be interesting 
to investigate whether high schizotypy is associated with greater tendency to impute 
agency in random or mechanical animations when ‘divergent thinking’ or reading 
meaning in randomness is controlled for.
The Stories Task, unlike the Triangles Task, produced no performance differences 
between high and low schizotypes in random conditions and there was no association
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between any individual dimension of schizotypy and the tendency to read meaning in 
randomness or to impute mental states in the random or physical conditions o f this task. 
The failure to find evidence of any such relationships in the Stories Task may reflect the 
fact that it is not possible to design items in auditory-verbal form that are unstructured in 
the way that visual items can be. They therefore provide more cues towards particular 
answers and leave less room for divergent thinking to be evidenced.
Perhaps related to these differences between the auditory-verbal and visual tasks, is the 
surprising lack of association between scores on the ToM conditions of the two tasks, 
The absence of a relationships between the tendency to impute ‘mental states’ in non- 
ToM conditions of each task, and between the tendency to read meaning in randomness 
in one task and the parallel tendency in the other was also unexpected. Much of ToM 
research is premised on the belief that scores on different measures of ToM reflect 
abilities in a single domain of functioning. However, a similar lack of association 
between ToM performance on verbal and non-verbal tasks has been found by other 
researchers (Harrington, Langdon, Siegert & McClure, 2005). These findings indicate a 
need for greater attention at least to the construct validity of paradigms designed to 
measure ToM, and possibly also to the validity o f current conceptualisations of ToM as 
a unitary domain of functioning.
These issues of validity may to some extent account for variation in findings across 
research into ToM in schizophrenia and psychosis-proneness, where a wide range of 
measures have been employed. Evidently, different ToM paradigms tap different 
abilities in addition to any putative ToM construct. For example, the Stories Task
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employed in this study, where stories were read aloud to participants once only before 
they were asked to respond to a question, draws more on auditory-verbal comprehension 
and memory than does the Triangles Task. The possible dependence o f Stories Task 
scores on auditory-verbal memory may mask an association between scores on the ToM 
conditions of this and the Triangles Tasks. However, there may also be variability 
within the domain of mentalizing that is not generally taken into account in ToM 
research. ToM abilities may be more fractionated, at least in some individuals, than is 
commonly assumed; they may be tied more closely to specific contexts or domains of 
functioning (e.g. verbal or non-verbal) than is often thought to be the case and may be 
affected by the level of explicitness of mentalizing demanded by the task and by non­
specific variables, such as anxiety, that are not normally taken into account in studies 
within this field.
A final point worth further investigation relates to the change in mentalizing abilities 
that accompanies transition to psychotic illness. It is clear that any abnormalities in 
ToM functioning associated with vulnerability to psychosis differ from those evident in 
patients diagnosed with schizophrenia. This difference may relate to changes in other 
abilities affected by psychotic illness, such as executive function. In addition, or 
alternatively, the change in mentalizing abilities accompanying transition to the 
psychotic state may be mediated by stress. Aspects o f cognitive function have been 
demonstrated to vary with anxiety (Braunstein-Bercovitz, Rammsayer, Gibbons & 
Lubow, 2002) and it is possible that ToM too is affected when an individual becomes 
anxious. Psychotic symptoms and the treatment protocols commonly encountered by 
those experiencing them are associated with high levels of distress (Shaw, McFarlane,
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Bookless & Air, 2002) and it may be that anxiety associated with this distress impacts 
on ToM. Future research into ToM functioning in those with prodromal signs of 
psychosis and those in the early stages of the illness will help to explore the pattern of 
change in ToM that accompanies the onset of psychosis.
The evidence for differences in social cognition in those at risk for psychosis has 
important clinical implications. Increasingly powerful and specific operational criteria 
are being developed for identifying those at ‘ultra-high-risk’ of developing a psychotic 
illness (e.g. Phillips, Yung & McGorry, 2000; Yung, Phillips, Yuen & McGorry, 2004). 
Insight into cognitive markers of vulnerability to psychosis can inform the further 
development of these criteria.
Psychological interventions are increasingly being offered to those in the earliest stages 
of psychotic illness, and in some cases to those with no history o f psychosis who exhibit 
the sub-clinical signs and symptoms often sited as precursors to its development. Such 
interventions may be usefully informed by greater understanding of cognitive markers of 
vulnerability to psychosis. Roncone et al. (2004) report a pilot study in which patients 
with schizophrenia who were treated with a therapeutic approach aimed at developing 
meta-cognitive strategies showed significant improvements on a first-order and a 
second-order ToM task and on a measure o f social functioning. It is possible that 
benefits could be derived from similar interventions with those at risk of developing a 
psychotic disorder, before illness manifests.
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The process o f conducting this experimental study into the relationship between theory 
of mind (ToM) and schizotypy has raised a number of interesting issues. The following 
discussion will reflect on these issues, beginning with those arising at the planning and 
recruitment stage of the project. Observations made during the process of testing 
participants and o f analysing and interpreting results will then be presented. The 
discussion will finish by considering the findings of the study in the context of wider 
clinical and theoretical perspectives and outlining possible directions for future research.
PLANNING THE STUDY
At the stage o f planning this study, a number o f issues immediately presented 
themselves. Few experimental investigations of ToM in schizotypy have been 
conducted and their findings have been inconsistent. The implications of this 
constrained the design of the current study in that the need to replicate evidence for a 
general association between ToM and psychosis-proneness superseded the need for 
investigation o f more specific questions. This was frustrating as it seemed more 
interesting to design the study focusing on the specifics (e.g. selecting participants so as
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to ensure greatest variability on a particular symptom-related dimension) than to aim to 
replicate existing findings. Although more specific questions could be addressed in a 
study devised to replicate general findings, the design of the study had to favour the 
latter.
From the outset, it was apparent that studies o f the relationship between ToM and both 
schizophrenia and psychosis-proneness have employed diverse methodology. As in 
much of the research into psychosis and associated characteristics/vulnerability factors, 
various approaches have been taken to measuring both schizophrenia and psychosis- 
proneness. Vulnerability to psychosis has been assessed using a range of questionnaires, 
and definitions o f schizophrenia have drawn on various criteria e.g. clinical diagnosis of 
schizophrenia and/or schizoaffective disorder or clinical ratings/self-reports of particular 
symptomatology. At the symptom/symptom cluster level, different methods of grouping 
participants have been used e.g. those based on a positive-negative symptom dichotomy 
and those focused on individual symptoms argued to be relevant on the basis of a 
particular theory. Furthermore, a range o f ToM paradigms has been employed in this 
field o f research, with variation in the nature of the task, the mode of presentation (e.g. 
verbal/visual/both), the non-mentalizing capacities also tapped by the task, the 
ecological validity o f the measure and the level o f explicitness of mentalizing 
demanded. The extent of variability between studies addressing similar questions made 
it difficult to identify consistencies, draw overall conclusions, and select measures and 
design a study to fill the gaps in the literature.
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A number of further considerations regarding the concepts under investigation presented 
themselves at the planning stage of the study. Firstly, both ToM and schizotypy seemed 
somewhat abstract as concepts (the multitude of measures employed in both ToM and 
schizotypy research is perhaps a reflection this.) Secondly, mentalizing in particular has 
been discussed extensively in a wide range of fields and approaches to the concept vary 
considerably. Thirdly, as an aspect of social cognition, ToM is to a large extent 
interpersonal and likely to be influenced by the emotional context of an interaction 
(Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist & Target, 2002). ToM differences may therefore manifest 
differently in real-life situations and under experimental conditions. All of these factors 
present challenges to the experimental study of ToM abilities in schizotypy.
Furthermore, the majority of the research into ToM has been concerned with identifying 
deficits associated with particular clinical conditions. Relatively little is known about 
individual differences in normal functioning ToM. In investigating mentalizing 
differences in the non-clinical population, where ToM functioning is unlikely to be 
seriously impaired, it was difficult to know what differences might exist other than a 
pure deficit.
The aspect o f difference in the ToM ability focused on in this study was the tendency to 
‘over-mentalize’ (i.e. to impute mental states in situations where most people would 
not.) To investigate this tendency a new ‘random stories’ condition was designed to 
accompany Fletcher et al.’s (1995) Stories Task. The process of designing these stories 
raised a number o f issues. Effort was made to match the stories in difficulty and length 
to those in the ‘physical’ and ‘ToM ’ conditions of the task. This raised questions such
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as how to measure length (e.g. by number of clauses, number o f words, or duration 
when read aloud). Secondly, the stories had to be as ‘random’ as possible, but at the 
same time had to be structured enough to be comprehensible such that participants 
would give a range o f responses. There seemed to be a great deal of subjectivity in, for 
example, what constitutes a connection between events. It did not seem possible to 
design stories that were random in the same sense as the unstructured movements of the 
triangles in the random condition of Abell, Happe and Frith’s (2000) task and, in fact, it 
was impossible to envisage a task in the auditory-verbal domain to parallel this random 
Triangles Task. This relates to the issue of measuring a single ability in multiple 
domains of functioning and raises the question o f whether consistency across domains 
can be assumed given the differences associated with, for example, verbal and non­
verbal modes of presentation.
SELECTING AND RECRUITING PARTICIPANTS
The method of recruiting participants employed in this study aimed to ensure that a wide 
range of schizotypy was represented in the sample. There was a high level of response 
to advertisements placed around the university campus and participants scoring across 
the range on the questionnaire used as a screen could be identified and recruited. There 
were however noticeably fewer responses from Tow schizotypes’ (i.e. those scoring 
more than one standard deviation below the population mean on the STA questionnaire) 
than from ‘high schizotypes’ (scoring more than one standard deviation above the 
population mean) and low schizotypes were hardest to recruit. Furthermore, amongst
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our sample, scores on the Tntrovertive Anhedonia’ scale of the O-LIFE questionnaire 
were negatively skewed with the majority of participants scoring highly on this scale. 
This experience draws attention to a consideration relating to participant selection 
particularly in research into aspects of personality. Clearly aspects of personality are 
associated to some extent with willingness to take part in experimental trials and the 
distribution of these variables in the sample is likely to be skewed unless attention is 
paid to ensuring that this is not the case.
COLLECTING THE DATA
The process o f collecting the data brought to light a number of considerations. It was 
clear that different participants had very different approaches to being tested. It seemed 
that a number of personality variables were likely to affect responses. For example 
those who were more extrovert might give more elaborated answers, and those more 
confident in their responses, or more experienced in participating in psychological 
studies, might feel less pressure to expand on their answers.
When the manner in which various participants responded to the test questions was 
attended to, it seemed that the same answers were often given for different reasons. For 
example, in ToM items of either task, one participant might respond quickly and briefly 
to a question, sound confident in their response and give little elaboration. Although 
they would make no reference to mental states, an appreciation of these would be 
implicit in their answer. The impression given would be that they understood the
120
story/animation and considered the importance of mental states to be obvious and not in 
need of explicit mention. Another individual might however give the same response but 
sound less certain and appear confused by the story/animation, giving the impression 
that they had not considered the mental states of the characters/triangles. The scoring 
system for each task failed to account for this and it was possible that the scores of some 
good mentalizers were for this reason misleadingly low.
Another example o f participants apparently giving the same answer for different reasons 
was in the random conditions of the Stories Task. Here participants were asked a 
question for which no direct answer was provided in the passage and there was variation 
in the extent to which individuals read into the information provided in order to respond. 
Some participants appeared to be thinking hard and searching for a logical response, 
whilst others would give similar answers, speaking with conviction and apparently 
giving the matter little thought. In line with the study hypotheses, the former 
respondents may have been low schizotypes who thought that, given that a question had 
been asked, they should be able to think of a logical answer with reference to the 
passage, whilst the latter category of participants may have been high schizotypes who 
instinctively read meaning into the random assortment o f pieces of information. The 
tendency o f participants to respond similarly to random story items for different reasons 
might account for the failure of the study to find a connection between schizotypy and 
tendency to ‘read meaning in randomness’ in the Stories Task.
In designing the study, it was assumed that, if  differences in ToM constituted a marker 
of vulnerability for psychosis, mentalizing scores would be normally distributed along a
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continuum throughout the non-clinical population, and that this distribution would be 
associated with that of schizotypy scores, with high schizotypes scoring most poorly on 
mentalizing accuracy and low schizotypes performing best. However, observations of 
participant performance during the data collection phase brought to mind the possibility 
that mentalizing scores might have a U-shaped relationship to schizotypy, with both 
very low schizotypes and very high schizotypes performing less accurately than those in 
the middle range. It seemed that some of the ‘low schizotypy’ group might have a more 
autistic-like cognitive style, which would be expected to be associated with poorer 
performance on ToM tasks (Frith, Morton & Leslie, 1991), whilst high schizotypes 
would be predicted to perform less accurately on measures of ToM on the basis of 
Frith’s (1992) theory.
At the data collection and recruitment stages of project, it was of great benefit to be 
working jointly with another researcher. The data collection and scoring of 
questionnaires was divided evenly between us, such that we each administered tasks 
additional to those we would eventually report. Overall, however, working jointly 
lessened the time spent by each o f us on recruitment, data collection and scoring. Both 
researchers were present at the time of testing of almost all participants. Although this 
decreased the extent to which we could be flexible about the times of testing 
participants, it enabled us to discuss our reflections on participants’ performance soon 
after testing. Such discussions helped to develop each of our ideas about the processes 
that might be contributing to performance patterns. Earlier, discussions around the 
design o f the study had been similarly beneficial in expanding our thoughts about how 
the project could best be carried out.
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ANALYSING TH E RESULTS
At the data analysis stage, it was striking how many apparently subjective decisions had 
to be made. Different statistical manuals recommend different approaches to 
determining whether the distributions of variables are adequate for normality to be 
assumed and for parametric tests to be applied. Decisions had to be made about whether 
it was preferable to leave variables untransformed, include outliers and perform non- 
parametric tests or to transform variables, exclude outliers and carry out parametric 
analyses. Whether one condition of a task (in this case the random stories and triangles 
conditions) was sufficiently analogous to other condition(s) (i.e. physical and ToM 
stories and triangles conditions) for performance on each to be compared also had to be 
considered, as did the way in which participants were grouped and scores computed. 
Here data could be analysed using either regressions or group comparisons. Preceding 
studies were used to give some guidance as to which approaches might be appropriate; it 
was preferable to employ techniques similar to those used in these studies in order to 
enable more direct comparisons to be made with their findings. However, variability 
across previous studies in how analyses were conducted made it difficult to make 
decisions through reference to these.
INTERPRETING FINDINGS
At the stage o f interpreting the findings, particular limitations became apparent. 
Attention was focused on possible alternative explanations for findings and it was clear
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that caution was required in drawing conclusions. Most notably, it became apparent that 
‘over-mentalizing’ might be purely a bi-product of ‘reading meaning in randomness’. 
The non-parametric nature of the data, precluded further exploration o f this possibility. 
It would be interesting to investigate whether an increased tendency to ‘read meaning in 
randomness’ amongst high as compared to low schizotypes remains after controlling for 
divergent thinking.
THE WIDER CONTEXT AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
When considering the findings o f this study within a wider context, it is immediately 
apparent how many different fields of research can be drawn on. This allows light to be 
shed on the findings but also throws up a huge number of possibilities for future 
research.
As an explanatory model o f psychotic illness, the cognitive-behavioural approach is 
becoming increasingly dominant and Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) has been 
shown to be effective in treating symptoms of psychosis (Haddock et al., 1998; 
Birchwood & Spencer, 1999). Cognitive models of psychosis (e.g. Garety, Kuipers, 
Fowler, Freeman & Bebbington, 2001) posit a central role for poor social understanding 
in symptom formation and maintenance, and CBT focuses on meta-cognitive skills and 
the viewing o f thoughts and beliefs as hypotheses rather than truths. Findings of 
abnormal mentalizing style in those prone to psychosis are therefore of relevance to 
cognitive-behavioural models, particularly when considering cognitive behavioural
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interventions in prodromal and first episode psychosis. With this in mind, there is a 
need for investigation of mentalizing abilities amongst those showing prodromal signs 
of psychosis and those who have recently experienced a first psychotic episode.
The ‘mentalization’ literature bridges a gap between cognitive and psychodynamic 
approaches. Fonagy has argued for differences in mentalizing arising from early 
experiences in the attachment relationship and for mentalizing deficits developing in 
some individuals in particular contexts as a means o f protection from psychic pain 
(Fonagy et al., 2002). In Fonagy et al.’s (2002) model, differences in mentalizing style 
arising in this way are implicated in patterns of relating seen in borderline personality 
disorder. However, given the association between psychosis and negative child-parent 
relationships (Schiffman et al., 2002) and early abuse/neglect (e.g. Read, van Os, 
Morrison & Ross, 2005), it would be interesting to investigate further the relationship 
between insecure attachment patterns and the later development of psychotic disorders.
The variability across contexts of mentalizing abilities, which Fonagy et al. (2002) 
discuss, raises the possibility that ToM varies with levels of anxiety. Effects of anxiety 
on other aspects o f cognition, such as latent inhibition, have been documented in the 
literature (Braunstein-Bercovitz, Rammsayer, Gibbons & Lubow, 2002) and there is a 
possibility that mentalizing too is affected when an individual is anxious. Psychotic 
symptoms and their treatment are associated with high levels of distress (Shaw, 
McFarlane, Bookless & Air, 2002) and it may be that anxiety related to this distress 
mediates the decline in ToM functioning that appears to accompany the onset of 
psychosis. There is little discussion of the possible impact of anxiety on ToM in the
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ToM and psychosis literature, anxiety is not generally controlled for in studies of 
mentalising and psychosis, and I did not consider controlling for anxiety when planning 
this study. However over the course of conducting the project, I became increasingly 
aware o f the potential for anxiety to impact on ToM performance. It would have been 
useful to have controlled for anxiety in this study and there is a need for future research 
into the impact of stress and anxiety on mentalizing.
Ideas from other areas of schizotypy research are also of relevance. The evidence for 
greater divergent thinking in high as compared to low schizotypes is well established 
(e.g. Eysenck & Fumham, 1993; Green & Williams, 1999) and it has been suggested 
that this characteristic may be accounted for in terms of reduced cognitive inhibition 
(Eysenck, 1993). Cognitive inhibition refers to the process involved in selective 
attention, o f inhibiting irrelevant stimuli and there is considerable evidence for a 
reduction in this capacity amongst those vulnerable to schizophrenia (e.g. Williams, 
1995). Reduced cognitive inhibition leaves an individual ‘inundated with an increased 
array o f percepts or ‘loose’ associative links’ (Green & Williams, 1999). It is possible 
that the current findings of an increased tendency amongst high schizotypes to see 
meaning in random animations might be explicable in terms of reduced cognitive 
inhibition. It would be useful to carry out further studies investigating the relationship 
between cognitive inhibition and divergent thinking and the tendency to ‘read meaning 
in randomness’ and ‘over-mentalize’.
Finally, it is interesting to consider this field of research in relation to clinical work. I 
currently work in an early intervention team for young people who have recently
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experienced a first episode of psychosis. In my clinical practice in this service, I have 
often observed clients making unusual attributions of mental states, or struggling to 
consider the thoughts and beliefs of other people. For example, while working within a 
cognitive-behavioural framework, a client may be asked what a friend might think in a 
given situation, as a means o f eliciting alternatives to their own negative thoughts. I 
have often been struck by the difficulty some of my clients have in entertaining the 
possibility that others might have thoughts that differ from their own when given this 
task.
One attempt to apply ToM and psychosis research to clinical practice is reported in a 
pilot study described by Roncone et al. (2004). These researchers found that patients 
with schizophrenia who were treated with a therapeutic approach aimed at developing 
meta-cognitive strategies showed significant improvements on a first-order and a 
second-order ToM task and on a measure o f social functioning. There is clearly a need 
for further investigation of the potential therapeutic applications of research into the 
relationship between ToM and schizophrenia and psychosis-proneness.
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INFORMATION SHEET FOR VOLUNTEERS
Study Title: Theory of Mind and Schizotypy
Investigators: Claire Williams, Department of Clinical Health Psychology,
UCL, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT 
 
Sophie Fyfe, Department of Clinical Health Psychology, 
UCL, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT 
 
Dr O. Mason, Department of Clinical Health Psychology, 
UCL, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT 
Dr G. Pickup, Department of Clinical Health Psychology, 
UCL, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT 
You are invited to participate in a research project which investigates the relationship between 
certain personality traits and the ability to work out what other people think in particular 
situations. As a healthy volunteer, the data you provide will give us information about the 
normal variation in people’s understanding o f  social situations.
You will be asked to  com plete a b rief screening questionnaire. On the basis o f  this you may 
then be asked to participate in the study. This would entail com pleting two more questionnaires, 
answering questions on some stories, com pleting two short tests o f  intelligence and reasoning 
ability, and answ ering questions about some objects you will watch moving around a screen.
This interview takes approxim ately one hour in total. Y our answers to all these questions will 
be com pletely confidential and identified only by a num ber rather than by your name. You will 
receive £10 for taking part, which is a ‘thank you’ gesture from us.
There are no potential risks involved in the research.
You do not have to take part in this study if you do not want to. If you decide to take part 
you may withdraw at any time without having to give a reason.
All proposals for research using human subjects are reviewed by an ethics committee 
before they can proceed. This proposal was reviewed by the UCL Committee on the Ethics 
of Human Research.
Please feel free to  ask any questions about the research, and we will do our best to answer them.
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CONFIDENTIAL 
CONSENT FORM FOR VOLUNTEERS
Study Title: Theory of Mind and Schizotypy
Investigators: Claire Williams, Department of Clinical Health Psychology,
UCL, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT 
Sophie Fyfe, Department of Clinical Health Psychology,
UCL, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT 
Dr O Mason, Department of Clinical Health Psychology, UCL, Gower 
Street, London WC1E 6BT 
Dr G. Pickup, Department of Clinical Health Psychology, UCL, Gower 
Street, London WC1E 6BT 
Yes No
Have you read the Participant Information sheet?
Has the project been explained to you orally?
Have you had the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study?
Have you received satisfactory answers to all your questions?
Have you received enough information about the study? 
Who have you spoken to?..............................................
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study without penalty 
at any stage?
Do you agree with the publication o f the results o f this study in an appropriate 
outlet/s?
Comment or Concerns During the Study
If you have any comments or concerns you should discuss these with the Principal Researcher. If 
you wish to go further and complain about any aspect o f the way you have been approached or 
treated during the course o f the study, you should email the Chair o f the UCL Committee for the 
Ethics o f Non-NHS Human Research ( ) or send a letter to: The Graduate 
School, North Cloisters, Wilkins Building, UCL, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT who will take 
the complaint forward as necessary.
Signed:................................................................  Date.........................................
Full Name in C apitals:......................................................................................................................
Signature o f W itness:....................................................... Date.......................................................
Full Name in C apitals:......................................................................................................................
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University College London 
Gower Street London WC1E6BT
Head of the Graduate School
14 March 2005 
Dr Oliver Mason
Sub-Department of Clinical Health Psychology 
UCL
Dear Dr Mason
Re: Notification of Ethical Approval
Project ID: 0416/001: Study to test the predictions of Frith’s cognitive
neuropsychological model of schizophrenia
The above research has been given ethical approval following review by the Chair of the 
UCL Committee for the Ethics of non-NHS Human Research for the duration of the project 
subject to the following conditions:
1. You must seek Chair’s approval for proposed amendments to the research for which this 
approval has been given. Ethical approval is specific to this project and must not be 
treated as applicable to research of a similar nature. Each research project is reviewed 
separately and if there are significant changes to the research protocol you should seek 
confirmation of continued ethical approval by completing the ‘Amendment Approval 
Request Form’.
The form identified above can be accessed by logging on to the ethics website homepage: 
http://www.grad.ucl.ac.uk/ethics/ and clicking on the button marked 'Key Responsibilities of 
the Researcher Following Approval’.
2. It is your responsibility to report to the Committee any unanticipated problems or adverse 
events involving risks to participants or others. Both non-serious and serious adverse 
events must be reported.
Reporting Non-Serious Adverse Events.
For non-serious adverse events you will need to inform Ms , Ethics 
Committee Administrator ( ). within ten days of an adverse incident 
occurring and provide a full written report that should include any amendments to the 
participant information sheet and study protocol. The Chair or Vice-Chair of the Ethics 
Committee will confirm that the incident is non-serious and report to the Committee at the 
next meeting. The final view of the Committee will be communicated to you.
Reporting Serious Adverse Events
The Ethics Committee should be notified of all serious adverse events via the Ethics 
Committee Administrator immediately the incident occurs. Where the adverse incident is
Letter to Dr Mason 14/03/2005
unexpected and serious, the Chair or Vice-Chair will decide whether the study should be 
terminated pending the opinion of an independent expert. The adverse event will be 
considered at the next Committee meeting and a decision will be made on the need to 
change the information leaflet and/or study protocol.
3. On completion of the research you must submit a brief report (a maximum of two sides of 
A4) of your findings/concluding comments to the Committee, which includes in particular 
issues relating to the ethical implications of the research.
Chair of the UCL Ethics Committee
Cc: Sophie Fyfe and Claire Williams, Trainee Clinical Psychologists, Sub-Department of 
Clinical Health Psychology, UCL
Your^'sincerely
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Sex M  F (please delete either M  or F  leaving only your response)
Please answer each question by deleting either Y or M  leaving only your response.
1. Do you believe in telepathy?
Y N
2. Do you often feel that other people have it in for you?
Y N
3. When in the dark do you often see shapes and forms, even though there’s 
nothing there?
Y N
4. If you say you will do something, do you always keep your promise no matter 
how inconvenient it might be?
Y N
5. Does your own voice ever seem distant, faraway?
Y N
6. Does it often happen that almost every thought immediately and automatically 
suggests an enormous number o f ideas?
Y N
7. Do you ever become over sensitive to light or noise?
Y N
8. Were you ever greedy by helping yourself to more than your share of anything?
Y N
9. Do you often have vivid dreams that disturb your sleep?
Y N
10. When you are worried or anxious do you have trouble with your bowels?
Y N
11. Have you ever felt when you looked in a mirror that your face seemed different?
Y N
139
12. Have you ever blamed someone for doing something you knew was really your 
fault?
Y N
13. Do you think it is safer to trust nobody?
Y N
14. Do things sometimes feel as if they were not real?
Y N
15. Do you feel lonely most of the time even when you’re with people?
Y N
16. Are all your habits good and desirable ones?
Y N
17. Do everyday things sometimes seem unusually large or small?
Y N
18. Are you often bothered by the feeling that people are watching you?
Y N
19. Do you feel that you cannot get ‘close’ to other people?
Y N
20. Have you ever taken anything (even a pin or a button) that belonged to someone 
else?
Y N
21. Do you dread going into a room by yourself where other people have already 
gathered and are talking?
Y N
22. Does your sense o f smell sometimes become unusually strong?
Y N
23. Are you sometimes sure that other people can tell what you are thinking?
Y N
24. Have you ever broken or lost something belonging to someone else?
Y N
25. Have you ever had the sensation of your body or part o f it changing shape?
Y N
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26. Do you ever feel sure that something is about to happen even though there 
doesn’t seem to be any reason for your thinking that?
Y N
27. Do you ever suddenly feel distracted by distant sounds that you are not normally 
aware of?
Y N
28. Have you ever said anything bad or nasty about anyone?
Y N
29. Do you ever have a sense o f vague danger or sudden dread for reasons that you 
do not understand?
Y N
30. Have you ever thought you heard people talking only to discover that it was in 
fact some nondescript noise?
Y N
31. Do your thoughts ever stop suddenly causing you to interrupt what you’re 
saying?
Y N
32. As a child were you ever cheeky to your parents?
Y N
33. Do you feel that you have to be on guard even with your friends?
Y N
34. Do you feel that your thoughts don’t belong to you?
Y N
35. When in a crowded room do you often have difficulty in following a 
conversation?
Y N
36. Have you ever cheated at a game?
Y N
37. Do you sometimes feel that your accidents are caused by mysterious forces?
Y N
38. Do you feel at times that people are talking about you?
Y N
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39. Do you believe that dreams can come true?
Y N
40. Have you ever taken advantage of someone?
Y N
41. Do you ever feel that your speech is difficult to understand because the words are 
all mixed up and don’t make sense?
Y N
42. Are your thoughts sometimes so strong that you can almost hear them?
Y N
43. When coming into a new situation, have you ever felt strongly that it was a 
repeat o f something that has happened before?
Y N
44. Do you always practice what you preach?
Y N
45. Have you ever felt that you were communicating with another person 
telepathically?
Y N
46. Are you easily distracted from work by daydreams?
Y N
47. Are you very hurt by criticism?
Y N
48. Do you sometimes put off until tomorrow what you ought to do today?
Y N
49. Do you ever get nervous when someone is walking behind you?
Y N
Thank you for your time.
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O-LIFE QUESTIONNAIRE
Please read these instructions before completing the questionnaire:
These questions relate to your thoughts, feelings, experiences and preferences. There are 
no right or wrong answers or trick questions so please be as honest as possible.
For each question please choose either YES or NO and circle this on the form. Please 
do not spend too much time thinking about it -  choose the answer closest to your own.
1. Do you often hesitate when you are going to say something in a group of people
whom you more or less know?
2. Do you often overindulge in alcohol or food?
3. Are the sounds you hear in your daydreams really clear and distinct?
4. Do you enjoy many different kinds of play and recreation?
5. Do your thoughts sometimes seem as real as actual events in your life?
6. Does it often happen that nearly every thought immediately and automatically
suggests an enormous number of ideas?
7. When in a group o f people do you usually prefer to let someone else be the centre of
attention?
8. Do you frequently have difficulty in starting to do things?
9. Has dancing or the idea of it always seemed dull to you?
10. When you catch a train do you often arrive at the last minute?
11. Is trying new foods something you have always enjoyed?
12. Do you often change between intense liking and disliking o f the same person?
13. Have you ever cheated at a game?
14. Are there very few things that you have ever really enjoyed doing?
15. Do you at times have an urge to do something harmful or shocking?
16. Do you often worry about things you should not have done or said?
17. Are your thoughts sometimes so strong that you can almost hear them?
18. Are you usually in an average sort of mood, not too high and not too low?
19. Would you take drugs which may have strange or dangerous effects?
20. Do you think you could learn to read other's minds if you wanted to?
21. When in a crowded room, do you often have difficulty in following a conversation?
22. No matter how hard you try to concentrate do unrelated thoughts creep into your 
mind?
23. Are you easily hurt when people find fault with you or the work you do?
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24. Do you stop to think things over before doing anything?
25. Have you ever felt that you have special, almost magical powers?
26. Are you much too independent to really get involved with other people?
27. Do ideas and insights sometimes come to you so fast that you cannot express them 
all?
28. Do you easily lose your courage when criticised or failing in something?
29. Can some people make you aware of them just by thinking about you?
30. Does a passing thought ever seem so real it frightens you?
31. Have you ever blamed someone for doing something you know was really your 
fault?
32. Are you a person whose mood goes up and down easily?
33. Does your voice ever seem distant or faraway?
34. Do you think having close friends is not as important as some people say?
35. Are you rather lively?
36. Are you sometimes so nervous that you are 'blocked'?
37. Do you find it difficult to keep interested in the same thing for a long time?
38. Do you dread going into a room by yourself where other people have already 
gathered and are talking?
39. Does it often feel good to massage your muscles when they are tired or sore?
40. Do you sometimes feel that your accidents are caused by mysterious forces?
41. Do you like mixing with people?
42. On seeing a soft thick carpet have you sometimes had the impulse to take off your 
shoes and walk barefoot on it?
43. Do you often have difficulties in controlling your thoughts?
44. Do the people in your daydreams seem so true to life that you sometimes think they 
are real?
45. Are people usually better off if they stay aloof from emotional involvements with 
people?
46. Can just being with friends make you feel really good?
47. Is your hearing sometimes so sensitive that ordinary sounds become uncomfortable?
48. Have you often felt uncomfortable when your friends touch you?
49. When things are bothering you do you like to talk to other people about it?
50. Do you have many friends?
51. Would being in debt worry you?
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52. Do you think people spend too much time safeguarding their future with savings and 
insurance?
53. Do you ever have the urge to break or smash things?
54. Do you often feel that there is no purpose to life?
55. Do you worry about awful things that might happen?
56. Have you ever felt the urge to injure yourself?
57. Would it make you nervous to play the clown in front of other people?
58. Have you felt that you might cause something to happen just by thinking too much 
about it?
59. Have you had very little fun from physical activities like walking, swimming, or 
sports?
60. Do you feel so good at controlling others that it sometimes scares you?
61. Are you easily distracted from work by daydreams?
62. Are you easily confused if too much happens at the same time?
63. Do you ever have a sense of vague danger or sudden dread for reasons that you do 
not understand?
64. Is it true that your relationships with other people never get very intense?
65. Have you sometimes had the feeling o f gaining or losing energy when certain people 
look at you or touch you?
66. Do you worry too long after an embarrassing experience?
67. Do you love having your back massaged?
68. Do you consider yourself to be pretty much an average kind of person?
69. Have you ever taken advantage o f someone?
70. Would you like other people to be afraid of you?
71. Have you ever thought you heard people talking only to discover that it was in fact 
some nondescript noise?
72. Have you occasionally felt as though your body did not exist?
73. Do you often feel lonely?
74. Do you often have an urge to hit someone?
75. Do you often experience an overwhelming sense o f emptiness?
76. On occasions, have you seen a person's face in front o f you when no one was in fact 
there?
77. Is it fun to sing with other people?
78. Do you often have days when indoor lights seem so bright that they bother your 
eyes?
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79. Have you wondered whether the spirits of the dead can influence the living?
80. Do people who try to get to know you better usually give up after a while?
81. Do you often feel 'fed up'?
82. Have you felt as though your head or limbs were somehow not your own?
83. When you look in the mirror does your face sometimes seem quite different from 
usual?
84. Do people who drive carefully annoy you?
85. Would you call yourself a nervous person?
86. Can you usually let yourself go and enjoy yourself at a lively party?
87. Do you ever suddenly feel distracted by distant sounds that you are not normally 
aware of?
88. Do you sometimes talk about things you know nothing about?
89. When in the dark do you often see shapes and forms even though there's nothing 
there?
90. Have you sometimes sensed an evil presence around you, even though you could not 
see it?
91. Is it hard for you to make decisions?
92. Do you find the bright lights of a city exciting to look at?
93. Does your sense o f smell sometimes become unusually strong?
94. Do you usually have very little desire to buy new kinds o f food?
95. Do you ever feel that your speech is difficult to understand because the words are all 
mixed up and don't make sense?
96. Do you often feel like doing the opposite o f what other people suggest, even though 
you know they are right?
97. Do you like going out a lot?
98. Do you feel very close to your friends?
99. Do you ever feel sure that something is about to happen, even though there does not 
seem to be any reason for you thinking that?
100. Do you often feel the impulse to spend money which you know you can't afford?
101. Are you easily distracted when you read or talk to someone?
102. Do you feel that making new friends isn't worth the energy it takes?
103. Do you believe in telepathy?
104. Do you prefer watching television to going out with other people?
Thank you very much for taking the time and effort to fill this in.
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At the start o f the task, the tester says: ‘I am going to play you some stories and after 
each one there will be a question. I want you to listen to the story and then answer the 
question. First of all there will be a practice story so you can get the hang of it. Are you 
ready?’
Practice
On Christmas Eve, Alice’s mother takes her to the big department store in town. They 
go to look in the toy department. In the toy department Mr. Brown, Alice’s next-door 
neighbour is dressed up as Santa Claus, giving out sweets to all the children. Alice 
thinks she recognises Mr. Brown”, so she runs up to him and asks, “Who are you?” Mr. 
Brown answers, “I’m Santa Claus!”
Q: Why does he say this?
ToM Stories
Simon is a big liar. Simon's brother Jim knows this; he knows that Simon never tells the 
truth! Now yesterday Simon stole Jim's ping-pong paddle, and Jim knows Simon has 
hidden it somewhere, though he can't find it. He's very cross. So he finds Simon and he 
says, "Where is my ping-pong paddle? You must have hidden it either in the cupboard 
or under your bed, because I've looked everywhere else. Where is it, in the cupboard or 
under your bed?" Simon tells him the paddle is under his bed.
Q: Why will Jim look in the cupboard for the paddle?
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During the war, the Red army captures a member of the Blue army. They want him to 
tell them where his army's tanks are; they know they are either by the sea or in the 
mountains. They know that the prisoner will not want to tell them, he will want to save 
his army, and so he will certainly lie to them. The prisoner is very brave and very 
clever; he will not let them find his tanks. The tanks are really in the mountains. Now 
when the other side ask him where his tanks are, he says, "They are in the mountains".
Q: Why did the prisoner say that?
Brian is always hungry. Today at school it is his favourite meal - sausages and beans. 
He is a very greedy boy, and he would like to have more sausages than anybody else, 
even though his mother will have made him a lovely meal when he gets home! But 
everyone is allowed two sausages and no more. When it is Brian's turn to be served, he 
says, "Oh, please can I have four sausages, because I won't be having any dinner when I 
get home!"
Q: Why does Brian say this?
Jill wanted to buy a kitten, so she went to see Mrs. Smith, who had lots of kittens she 
didn't want. Now Mrs. Smith loved the kittens, and she wouldn't do anything to harm 
them, though she couldn't keep them all herself. When Jill visited she wasn't sure she 
wanted one of Mrs. Smith's kittens, since they were all males and she had wanted a 
female. But Mrs. Smith said, "If no one buys the kittens I'll just have to drown them!"
Q: Why did Mrs. Smith say that?
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One day Aunt Jane came to visit Peter. Now Peter loves his aunt very much, but today 
she is wearing a new hat; a new hat, which Peter thinks is very ugly indeed. Peter thinks 
his aunt looks silly in it, and much nicer in her old hat. But when Aunt Jane asks Peter, 
"How do you like my new hat?” Peter says, "Oh, its very nice".
Q: Why does he say that?
Helen waited all year for Christmas, because she knew at Christmas she could ask her 
parents for a rabbit. Helen wanted a rabbit more than anything in the world. At last 
Christmas Day arrived, and Helen ran to unwrap the big box her parents had given her. 
She felt sure it would contain a little rabbit in a cage. But when she opened it, with all 
the family standing round, she found her present was just a boring old set of 
encyclopaedias, which Helen did not want at all! Still, when Helen's parents asked her 
how she liked her Christmas present, she said, "It's lovely, thank you. It's just what I 
wanted".
Q: Why did she say this?
Late one night old Mrs. Peabody is walking home. She doesn't like walking home alone 
in the dark because she is always afraid that someone will attack her and rob her. She 
really is a very nervous person! Suddenly, out of the shadows comes a man. He wants 
to ask Mrs. Peabody what time it is, so he walks towards her. When Mrs. Peabody sees 
the man coming towards her, she starts to tremble and says, "Take my purse, just don't 
hurt me please!"
Q: Why did she say that?
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A burglar who has just robbed a shop is making his getaway. As he is running home, a 
policeman on his beat sees him drop his glove. He doesn't know the man is a burglar; he 
just wants to tell him he dropped his glove. But when the policeman shouts out to the 
burglar, "Hey, you! Stop!” the burglar turns round, sees the policeman, and gives 
himself up. He puts his hands up and admits that he did the break-in at the local shop.
Q: Why did the burglar do that?
Physical Stories
Two enemy powers have been at war for a very long time. Each army has won several 
battles, but now the outcome could go either way. The forces are equally matched. 
However, the Blue army is stronger than the Yellow army in foot soldiers and artillery. 
But the Yellow army is stronger than the Blue Army in air power. On the day of the 
final battle, which will decide the outcome of the war, there is heavy fog over the 
mountains where the fighting is about to occur. Low-lying clouds hang above the 
soldiers. By the end o f the day the Blue army has won.
Q: Why did the Blue army win?
A burglar is about to break into a jewellers' shop. He skilfully picks the lock on the shop 
door. Carefully he crawls under the electronic detector beam. If he breaks this beam it 
will set off the alarm. Quietly he opens the door of the storeroom and sees the gems 
glittering. As he reaches out, however, he steps on something soft. He hears a screech 
and something small and furry runs out past him, towards the shop door. Immediately 
the alarm sounds.
Q: Why did the alarm go off?
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Mrs. Simpson, the librarian, receives a special book, which she has to catalogue and find 
an appropriate place for. She has to decide which section to file it under. The library is 
very big, and has different sections on many different subjects. The new book is about 
plants and their medical uses, and is heavily illustrated. However, Mrs. Simpson does 
not put it on the shelf with the rest of the books on botany. Neither does she put it with 
the books on medicine. Instead, she carefully takes it into a separate room. In this room 
all the books are kept in special cases, and the temperature is kept constant.
Q: Why did she do this?
Henry is preparing for a big dinner party. He is famous for his excellent mayonnaise. 
He has bought lots of fresh eggs. The recipe says, "Carefully separate the yolks of six 
eggs and add oil very gradually". He has already bought easily enough dessert to feed 
everyone. However, he now looks up the recipe for meringues. Henry will not waste 
anything.
Q: Why does Henry make meringues?
Paul is very rich, and today he is going to buy an expensive new car. He is considering 
whether to make a single payment, or whether to spread the cost over the year. If he 
pays in monthly instalments, the dealer will charge five percent interest on the loan. His 
bank currently gives him eight percent interest on the money in his account. Even 
though he has easily enough money to pay the full amount, he decides to pay by 
monthly instalments.
Q: Why does he do that?
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Old Mrs. Robinson is very frail. One day she slips on her icy doorstep and falls on her 
side. She gets up right away, although she feels quite bruised and shaken. The next day 
her leg feels very stiff and she can scarcely walk. She makes her way to the doctors. As 
soon as the doctor hears about the fall, and sees her swollen side, he says, "Go 
immediately to the hospital". At the hospital they take an X-ray.
Q: Why did they take an X-ray?
Sarah is very long-sighted. She has only one pair of glasses, which she keeps losing. 
Today she has lost her glasses again and she needs to find them. She had them 
yesterday evening when she looked up the television programs. She must have left them 
somewhere that she has been today. She asks Ted to find her glasses. She tells him that 
today she went to her regular early morning exercise class, then to the post office, and 
last to the flower shop. Ted goes straight to the post office.
Q: Why is the post office the most likely place to look?
John is going shopping. He buys a nice new desk lamp, for his study. He needs a light 
bulb for his new lamp. He goes from the furniture department to the electrical 
department. In the electrical department he finds that there are two brands of light bulb 
o f the right kind. Everbrite light bulbs cost less in single packs than Literite bulbs. 
However, only Literite bulbs come in multi-packs o f six. John buys the multi-pack, 
even though he only needs one bulb.
Q: Why does John buy the Literite bulbs?
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Random Stories
Two football teams are playing against each other for the second time in the season. 
One is playing in yellow and the other is playing in red. The yellow team are playing at 
home but they are all very nervous. They run twice around the pitch before the match. 
They are playing in a new stadium, which is much bigger than the old stadium. It has 
been raining hard all morning but the sun comes out as soon as the match begins. The 
yellow team substitute a player after twenty minutes.
Q. Why do the yellow team substitute a player?
Pete has a brother called David. Pete is six foot two and taller than his brother. On 
Friday Pete had a cup o f tea in the cafe five doors down from his house and read an 
article about global warming in the newspaper. He was in an irritable mood. He booked 
a holiday to a seaside resort in the south of Spain. He had a conversation with his 
brother on the telephone and said at the end of the conversation, “I had better go now but 
please come and visit soon.” Pete hoovered the floor before going to bed.
Q. Why did Pete hoover the floor?
Amy likes her school very much. Her favourite subject is Art. Today she got to school 
early and sat at the back of the class. She played in the playground at break time. In the 
afternoon she did some difficult sums and managed to finish them all by herself and 
faster than everyone else. After school she went round to her piano teacher’s house next 
to the post-office for a piano lesson. She took her favourite piece of music and wore her 
red shoes.
Q. Why did Amy wear her red shoes?
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Mrs Williams has long blond hair. She went to the park with her dog for a morning 
walk. She is teaching Jenny who lives down the road how to knit. When they last met, 
Jenny said, “I keep dropping stitches when I try to knit quickly.” Mrs Williams planted 
some purple flowers in her garden. She had a bath with some bubble bath that she liked 
the smell of. She watched Coronation Street on television. She changed the light bulb 
in the hall.
Q. Why did Mrs Williams change the light bulb?
Aunt Anne said to Tom, “I have given up smoking.” It was Saturday. She made some 
biscuits and chocolate cake to have for tea. In the supermarket she bought lots of 
vegetables to make a big pot of soup. She walked three blocks down the road to post a 
letter. She surfed the Internet for an hour and a half before dinner.
Q. Why did Aunt Anne surf the Internet?
Mrs Evans is very old. She was sick three times in the morning and called Dr Jackson 
who came round quickly. She was wearing her favourite yellow dress. Mrs Evans used 
to be a dancer and likes to watch ballet on television. She had a ham sandwich for 
lunch. She lost her green broach when she was cleaning the house the day before. In 
the afternoon she paid her electricity bill at the local bank.
Q. Why did she pay her electricity bill?
Steven got up at 7.30 in the morning. It was his birthday and his parents gave him some 
computer games. He had breakfast with his family and ate toast and honey. He looked 
on the Internet for some books about turtles that he wanted to read but hadn’t been able
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to find in the bookshop. He rode his bicycle round the block very fast, passing a shop 
that had just opened in the village square. He stopped to read a big blue poster stuck to 
the bus shelter. He had a glass of orange squash and watched a science fiction 
programme on television.
Q. Why did Steven watch a science fiction programme?
A joyrider stole a white Vauxhall Astra and drove it into the centre of town. He passed 
a traffic warden who was putting a ticket on a car that was parked on a double yellow 
line. It was a very windy day although it had been sunny in the morning. The joyrider 
went home and washed his windows with a new cleaning product he had seen advertised 
on television and went for a drink in the local pub.
Q. Why did the joyrider go for a drink in the pub?
Scoring Criteria
Accuracy - ToM and physical stories 
2 points: Full and complete answer
1 point: Incomplete or partially correct answer
0 points: Incorrect answer
Accuracy - Random stories
2 points: Response referring to lack of available information relevant to the
question
1 point: Simple response involving an obvious inference
0 points: Obscure or elaborate response
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Response type
Responses were categorised as ‘mentalizing’, ‘physical’ or ‘random’ according to the 
criteria below.
Mentalizing: Any response involving mental state attribution e.g. thinking, wanting, 
tricking, lying.
Physical: Any response referring to physical causation without reference to mental
states.
Random: Any response referring to the random nature of the passage, and/or the
inability to deduce a response from available information, without
reference to physical causation or mental states.
(Reading meaning in randomness ’ score
A ‘reading meaning in randomness’ score was computed by summing the number of 
connections made between distinct bits of information in the each story, and the number 
of elaborations given (pieces o f information added to the most simple response).
Examples of Accuracy Scores 
ToM condition
•  Jim and the ping pong bat 
2 points: Reference to Jim knowing Simon lies.
E.g. Because Simon has not told the truth.
He knows Simon is a liar and will try to make him look in a 
different place.
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1 point: ref to facts (e.g. that’s where it really is), or Simon hiding it without ref to
implications of lying.
E.g. He thinks that Simon has hidden it in the cupboard.
0 points: Reference to general non-specific information.
E.g. Because he looked everywhere else.
Because Simon told him it was there.
He knows it’s either in the cupboard or under the bed.
Because he normally kept the paddle there.
• Mrs Smith and the kitten
2 points: Reference to persuasion, manipulating feelings, trying to induce guilt/pity
etc.
E.g. She would make Jill feel sorry for the kittens and make her take 
one.
To make Jill feel guilty and take one.
To scare Jill into buying one.
She wanted to emotionally blackmail Jill and force her to buy one. 
1 point: Reference to outcome (to sell them or get rid of them in a way which
implies not drowning), or simple motivation (to make Jill sad)
E.g. So Jill buys a kitten anyway.
There are too many o f them and she can’t keep them so she wants 
Jill to take one.
She wants the girl to take one.
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0 points: Reference to general knowledge or dilemma without realisation that the
statement was not true
E.g. She’s a horrible woman / she hates cats/there are too many and 
she can’t keep them / Her house isn’t big enough.
She wants a female cat.
Physical condition
•  Leg and X-ray
2 points: Reference to possibility that she has fractured/broken her hip/leg (e.g.
they want to see if she’s broken anything). Reference to wanting to know 
or trying to find out (i.e. ‘it was broken’ is not enough). Must ref to fact 
that they know that x-rays are about broken things or bones.
E.g. To see if there’s any damage to the bone.
To see how bad the fracture could be.
1 point: Reference to general aim (e.g. to see what’s wrong. Because of her fall
she might have damaged something).
E.g. It’s bruised and stiff.
To see why it’s stiff.
0 points: Reference to irrelevant or incorrect factors (e.g. that’s what doctors do).
Reference to X-rays being cures themselves (e.g. to mend her leg).
E.g. Because she fell.
To make it better.
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• Armies and fog
2 points: Reference to both weather conditions and relative ground superiority or
inability of other army’s planes to be useful in fog (names of armies 
unimportant).
E.g. It was foggy and so the planes couldn’t see the ground and so it 
was difficult for them to shoot the soldiers. So the foot soldiers 
had the advantage.
1 point: Reference either to weather or to relative superiority on ground versus air
(e.g. because it was foggy). Nothing about why weather makes it 
especially difficult for planes or nothing about planes being affected more 
than tanks. Reference to fog to justify incorrect response (e.g. the 
aeroplanes won because the fog meant they could hide from the tanks). 
E.g. It was foggy.
The army on the ground was stronger than the army in the air.
0 points: Reference to irrelevant or incorrect information (e.g. they won because
they had better planes). Justifications for why tanks are better than 
planes.
E.g. Because that’s where they were after the war with the yellow 
army.
They had aeroplanes, which can shoot tanks from the air.
The other soldiers lost.
Foot soldiers and tanks can’t see when it’s really foggy but planes 
can fly through the air.
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Random condition
• Amy and her red shoes
2 points: Reference to the lack of available information in the story
E.g. I don’t know
It doesn’t tell you in the story
1 point: Reference to an obvious reason for wearing red shoes
E.g. Because she wanted to
Because they were the shoes she was wearing that day
0 point: Elaborate or obscure response
E.g. Because they matched the post box
Because they were her lucky shoes and she was having a very 
lucky day
• Football team substituting a player
2 points: Reference to the lack o f available information in the story
E.g. I don’t know
It doesn’t tell you in the story
1 point: Reference to an obvious reason for substituting a player
E.g. Because the other player was injured
Because a player was tired and needed to come off
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0 point: Elaborate or obscure response
E.g. Because one of the players was so nervous that he slipped in the 
rainy pitch because he was nervous





At the start o f the task, the tester says: ‘In a moment I’m going to play you some 
animations. I want you to watch each animation and then tell me what you think was 
happening in it. First o f all there will be two practices so you can get the hang of it. Are 
you ready?’
After each item, participants are asked: ‘What do you think was happening in that one?’
Scoring Criteria 
Accuracy
2 points: Spot-on description o f the story or the actions represented; can be concise
just capturing gist, or can be discursive 
1 point: Partial description o f the sequence; description is related to the sequence,
but imprecise or incomplete 
0 point: Bizarre descriptions, plainly wrong descriptions, and responses that focus
solely on a minor unimportant aspect o f the sequence
Response type
Responses were categorized as ‘mentalizing’, ‘interaction/goal directed’ or ‘random’ 
according to the following criteria. In each case the highest level of descriptive 
language is scored (i.e. mentalizing trumps interaction trumps action).
163
Mentalizing: Any response which uses mental states verbs e.g. wanting; hiding;
tricking; pretending; being naughty. NOT: complex interaction, e.g. 
chasing each other round the house; x pushing y out of the way. NOT: 
solely direct speech.
Interaction/goal-directed: Specific reference to purposeful movement, without
reference to mental states e.g. following; fighting; copying; racing. More 
than one action may be described, e.g. leading and following. NOT: 
purposeless action. NOT: implied mental state attribution.
Random: Simple action, no mention of a goal and no reference to interaction of the
characters or to mental states, e.g. floating.
*Reading meaning in randomness ’ score
A ‘reading meaning in randomness’ score was computed by summing the number of 
references made to connections between the movements of the two triangles in each 
animation, and the number o f elaborations given (pieces of information added to the 
most simple response).
Examples of Accuracy Scores 
Random Condition
Floating/Bouncing: Character roles: just triangles (both sequences without enclosure)
2 points: Anything implying random or purposeless movement including moving,
bouncing, just dancing 
1 point: Purposeful movement without interaction, including turning round and
getting dizzy, dancing in a circle
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0 points: Purposeful movement implying interaction between the triangles
including copying each other; avoiding each other
Physical condition
• Fighting: Character roles: two deer. No enclosure.
2 points: Action implying physical fight, e.g. bashing each other
1 point: Action that conveys the idea of a conflict but is either too specific or too
vague, e.g. biting; pushing
0 points: Action that does not relate to conflict, e.g. following each other
• Following: Character roles: mother duck and duckling. Enclosure.
2 points: Description that conveys following each other
1 point: Description that is related to but somewhat remote from following, e.g.
copying; chasing
0 points: Action that does not relate to following each other, e.g. jumping 
ToM condition
• Surprising: Character roles: grandma and grandson. Enclosure.
2 points: Any mention of boy tricking, surprising his grandma; hiding, hide and
seek
1 point: Description that gives part of the story but misses the critical point (see
above)
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0 points: Description which gives only minor part o f action e.g. knocking on the
door, or does not relate to any of the events in the sequence.
• Coaxing: Character roles: mother and child. Enclosure.
2 points: Description that conveys child's reluctance to go out and mother's
attempts to get child out, e.g. persuading
1 point: Partially correct description focusing on one aspect of the story or one
character only, e.g. child does not want to go out; or, mother is pushing 
child to go out
0 points: Actions that do not relate to the events or relate to a minor aspect of the
sequence only, e.g. dancing together, or unrelated description.
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APPENDIX 4: C orrelations Between O -LIFE Scores and C ontrol Variables
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Hayling Pearson r -0.26* -0.22 -0.27* -0.089 -0.23
Sig. 0.043 0.084 0.034 0.49 0.076
N 62 62 62 62 62
Performance IQ Pearson r -0.17 -0.17 -0.091 -0.082 -0.16
Sig. 0.20 0.19 0.48 0.53 0.21
N 62 62 62 62 62
Verbal IQ Pearson r -0.16 -0.16 -0.087 -0.084 -0.16
Sig. 0.21 0.21 0.50 0.52 0.23
N 62 62 62 62 62
O noo
APPENDIX 5: C orrelations Between Experim ental and C ontrol Variables
Table 1: Stories Task - Parametric correlations between experimental and
control variables
Table 2: Triangles Task - Parametric correlations between experimental and
control variables
Table 3: Stories and Triangles Tasks - Non-parametric correlations between
experimental and control variables
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Hayling Pearson r 0.05 0.15 -0.033 -0.033 0.001 0.001
Sig. 0.70 0.26 0.80 0.80 0.99 0.996
N 61 62 62 61 62 62
Performance IQ Pearson r 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.005 -0.046 0.032
Sig. 0.13 0.25 0.36 0.97 0.72 0.80
N 61 62 62 61 62 62
Verbal IQ Pearson r 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.016 -0.042 0.005
Sig. 0.14 0.25 0.41 0.90 0.74 0.97
N 61 62 62 61 62 62
* Variable square root transformed










Hayling Pearson r 0.234 0.16 -0.23
Sig. 0.068 0.23 0.071
N 62 62 61
Performance IQ Pearson r -0.18 -0.15 0.12
Sig. 0.17 0.26 0.37
N 62 62 61
Verbal IQ Pearson r -0.17 -0.13 0.12
Sig. 0.18 0.31 0.35
N 62 62 61
* Variable square root transformed
















meaning into in physical 
randomness condition
Hayling P 0.18 -0.21 -0.16 -0.15 -0.079 -0.029
Sig. 0.17 0.097 0.22 0.23 0.54 0.83
N 62 62 62 62 62 62
Performance IQ P -0.14 0.10 0.15 -0.055 0.010 0.028
Sig. 0.27 0.43 0.23 0.67 0.94 0.83
N 62 62 62 62 62 62
Verbal IQ P -0.15 0.10 0.16 -0.053 0.027 0.011
Sig. 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.68 0.83 0.93
N 62 62 62 62 62 62
to






Correlations between experimental variables
Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy 

















Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Reading 
ToM Physical Random meaning in 



















































p 0.218 1.000 -0.267* 0.372** 0.065 0.259* -0.062 0.136 -0.193 0.139 0.217 0.078
Accuracy
Physical Sig- 0.088 0.036 0.003 0.616 0.042 0.634 0.292 0.133 0.282 0.090 0.545
condition N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Accuracy
Random
P -00.060 -0.267* 10.000 -0.740** 0.061 -0.477** 0.147 0.016 0.102 -0.204 -0.139 -0.225
Sig. 0.645 0.036 0.000 0.640 0.000 0.255 0.902 0.432 0.112 0.281 0.078



























randomness N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Mental state P 0.032 0.065 0.061 0.003 1.000 0.195 -0.245 -0.027 0.159 -0.183 -0.214 0.047
responses Sig 0.806 0.616 0.640 0.983 0.129 0.055 0.834 0.217 0.154 0.095 0.716
Physical
condition N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Mental state P 0.139 0.259* -0.477** 0.411** 0.195 1.000 -0.343** 0.052 -0.064 0.079 0.067 0.195
responses Sig 0.281 0.042 0.000 0.001 0.129 0.006 0.688 0.623 0.544 0.604 0.129
Random











Accuracy Accuracy Reading 













Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Reading 
ToM Physical Random meaning in 



















































Accuracy P 0.047 0.136 0.016 -0.035 -0.027 0.052 0.256* 1.000 0.020 -0.094 -0.029 -0.113
Physical Sig. 0.715 0.292 0.902 0.789 0.834 0.688 0.045 0.877 0.470 0.826 0.383
condition N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Accuracy P 0.125 -0.193 0.102 -0.007 0.159 -0.064 -0.149 0.020 1.000 -0.894** -0.945** -0.384**
Random Sig. 0.333 0.133 0.432 0.956 0.217 0.623 0.247 0.877 0.000 0.000 0.002
condition N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Reading P -0.127 0.139 -0.204 0.143 -0.183 0.079 0.106 -0.094 -0.894** 1.000 0.841** 0.395**
meaning in Sig. 0.326 0.282 0.112 0.266 0.154 0.544 0.410 0.470 0.000 0.000 0.001
randomness N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Agency P -0.050 0.217 -0.139 0.040 -0.214 0.067 0.132 -0.029 -0.945** 0.841** 1.000 0.322*
attributions Sig. 0.700 0.090 0.281 0.758 0.095 0.604 0.307 0.826 0.000 0.000 0.011
condition N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Mental state P -0.224 0.078 -0.225 .041 0.047 0.195 -0.031 -0.113 -0.384** 0.395** 0.322* 1.000
responses
Physical
Sig. 0.081 0.545 0.078 0.750 0.716 0.129 0.810 0.383 0.002 0.001 0.011
condition N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed)
<1
